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Summary
Summary in English
Essay 1: Mutual fund ﬂight-to-liquidity
The ﬁrst essay provides a demand-side explanation for the relationship between liquidity
premium and market volatility. While existing research investigates the impact of market
uncertainty on mutual fund capital ﬂows, a direct link between uncertainty-induced fund
behaviour and the market price of liquidity have not been examined. This paper bridges
this gap by showing one channel through which market uncertainty impacts the liquidity
premium.
In order to examine the relationship between market uncertainty and the price of liquid-
ity, I draw on insight from Vayanos (2004). In his model, investors withdraw their money if
a fund performs poorly, which is more likely during times of high market uncertainty. Con-
sequently, redemption obligations increase when markets are volatile and fund managers put
the value of ﬂexibility before its cost by adjusting portfolios toward liquid assets. Market
uncertainty induces an aggregate shift in mutual fund demand for liquidity, which feeds back
into the market price of liquidity and generates time-variation in the liquidity premium. My
empirical analysis exploits the structure suggested by Vayanos (2004) to examine this causal
chain.
My analysis contributes to the literature along a number of dimensions. My primary
contribution is to show that aggregate mutual fund active liquidity management, driven by
market volatility, inﬂuences the market price of liquidity. Underlying this ﬁnding at the
aggregate level, I show a strong and robust response of mutual funds to market volatility
that uncovers the fundamental mechanisms driving this aggregate response. First, I establish
that market uncertainty is associated with lower fund performance and withdrawals. Second,
in response to the threat of withdrawals, funds actively rebalance their portfolios toward
more liquid assets. This ﬁnding is stronger when (1) funds are in an initially weak liquidity
position, and (2) when funds have greater exposure to uncertainty, as captured by the
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fund-speciﬁc volatility measure that I develop. I establish that these ﬁndings are robust to
incorporation of cash to analyse the joint decisions regarding cash and equity asset liquidity,
and to using variation driven by market volatility that is not forcastable.
Essay 2: House Prices and Taxes (co-authored with Mads Gjedsted
Nielsen)
The second essay focuses on the response of residential house prices to the change in mu-
nicipal income and property tax rates. In order to identify the causal relationship between
taxes and house prices, we exploit exogenous variation in municipal income and property
tax rates stemming from a 2007 municipality reform.
The 2007 municipality reform was introduced for the purpose of enhancing economies
of scale at the municipal level by merging smaller municipalities into larger ones. With
the exemption of only four small islands, all municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants had
to merge with one or more nearby municipalities in order to create a new municipalities
of at least 30,000 inhabitants. After the reform, the merged municipalities had to set a
new and common tax rate. If the merging municipalities did not have equal tax rates
prior to the reform, the common rate would induce a change in taxes for at least one of
the merging municipalities. Merging municipalities had to set the new tax rates equal to
or lower than an average of the previous tax rates, plus an adjustment for changes in the
public service task handled by the municipalities. Our identiﬁcation strategy uses a two-
stage least squares approach in order to address potential endogeneity issues. In particular,
we instrument the post-reform tax rates with the average of the pre-reform tax rates in
the merging municipalities. As we show, the pre-reform average is closely related to the
chosen tax rate, and is independent of any factors that might inﬂuence house prices, such
as contemporaneous economic conditions in the municipality.
We ﬁnd that a 1%-point increase in the income tax rate lead to a drop in house prices
of 7.9% and a 1 -point increase in the property tax rate lead to a 1.1% drop in house
prices. The simple present value of a 1%-point perpetual income tax increase and of a 1 -
point property tax increase, relative to the median house price correspond to 7% and 3.3%,
respectively. Our ﬁndings are thus in line with predicted values. This indicates that the
housing market eﬃciently incorporates taxes into house prices.
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Essay 3: Local Economic Conditions and Local Equity Preferences:
Evidence from Mutual Funds during the U.S. Housing Boom and
Bust (co-authored with Chandler Lutz and Ben MacLean Sand)
The third essay examines how variation in local economic conditions aﬀect mutual fund
manager’s portfolio allocation decisions and subsequent fund performance. While previous
research documents a strong relationship between market-wide conditions (e.g. business
cycle) and fund returns, there is relatively little known about the impact of local economic
conditions (proxied here by house price growth). In particular, time-varying local conditions
may fuel fund manager’s intrinsic biases and aﬀect a fund’s performance.
In our analysis, we ﬁnd that mutual funds respond to changes in local housing prices
by shifting the degree of home bias in their equity portfolios; negative house price shocks
cause funds to tilt their portfolio in favour of nearby equity holdings. However, we do
not ﬁnd that housing price shocks are related to what we call ‘fund tangibles’ (net-ﬂows,
liquidity position, etc.). Thus, the relationship between the home bias and house price
shocks that we document is not being driven by fund investors’ reaction to a change in
local economic conditions. We argue that asset information advantage or familiarity are
unrelated to local housing price shocks. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest a bias in fund manager
behaviour that is unrelated to information or familiarity. This previously undocumented
behavioural bias is of ﬁrst-order importance, as the shift in mutual fund preferences towards
local stocks induced by deterioration in local economic conditions is associated with mutual
fund underperformance.
Our key ﬁnding is that deterioration in local economic conditions is associated with a shift
in fund manager’s preferences towards geographically proximate assets. A one percentage
point drop in local house prices is related to a decrease in mean distance between a fund and
its holdings by 36 km and increase in a fraction of portfolio held locally by 0.73 percentage
point. We also investigate the consequences of house price driven portfolio shifts in terms
of fund performance. By relating future fund performance directly with local house price
shocks, we ﬁnd that a one percentage point reduction in local house prices is associated
with a 25 bsp and 51 bsp decrease in future 3- and 6-month characteristic-adjusted returns,
respectively. We then split fund portfolios into local and distant stocks, and calculate the
future performance of each sub-portfolio. We ﬁnd that underperformance is concentrated
in the portfolio of local stocks. Finally, we directly relate a manager’s degree of home bias
to fund future performance. Our two-stage least squares estimates suggest that home bias
causes underperformance. A one percent increase in the fraction of local stocks in a portfolio
decreases 6-month characteristic-adjusted returns by 69.9 basis points. Overall, our ﬁndings
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suggest that fund reaction to house price shocks reﬂects a response to perceived risk and
fund managers view local assets as being safer, and this behavioural bias leads to poorer
fund performance.
Summary in Danish
Essay 1: Investeringsforeningers ﬂugt-til-likviditet
Det første essay giver en forklaring p˚a forholdet imellem likviditetspræmien og markedsvolatiliteten.
Mens den eksisterende litteratur undersøger eﬀekten af markedsusikkerhed p˚a investerings-
foreningers kapitalbevægelser, har et direkte link imellem investeringsforeningers adfærd
induceret af usikkerhed og markedsprisen for likviditet ikke været undersøgt. Dette essay
udfylder netop dette hul ved at vise en kanal i hvilken markedsusikkerhed p˚avirker likviditet-
spræmien.
For at kunne undersøge dette forhold mellem markedsusikkerhed og likviditetspræmien,
trækker jeg p˚a resultater fra Vayanos (2004). I denne model trækker investorer deres penge
fra d˚arligt præsterende investeringsforeninger, hvilket er mere sandsynligt i tider med høj
markedsusikkerhed. Som en konsekvens vil indløsningsforpligtelserne stige n˚ar markederne
er volatile og fondsforvaltere foretrækker værdien af ﬂeksibilitet frem for omkostningerne
ved at justere porteføljer mod likvide aktiver. Markedsusikkerhed inducerer et samlet skift i
investeringsforeningers efterspørgsel efter likviditet, hvilket føder tilbage ind i markedsprisen
for likviditet og genererer tidsvariation i likviditetspræmien. Min empiriske analyse udnytter
denne struktur foresl˚aet af Vayanos (2004) til at undersøge denne a˚rsagsforbindelse.
Min analyse bidrager til den eksisterende litteratur langs en række dimensioner. Mit
primære bidrag er at vise at investeringsforeningers samlede aktive likviditetsstyring, drevet
af markedsvolatiltet, p˚avirker markedsprisen for likviditet. Underliggende denne konklusion
p˚a det aggregerede niveau, ﬁnder jeg en stærk og robust reaktion af investeringsforeninger p˚a
markedsusikkerhed, som afslører den fundamentale mekanisme, der driver denne aggregerede
reaktion. Først etablerer jeg, at markedsusikkerhed er associeret med lavere performance
og indløsninger. Dernæst, som svar p˚a truslen om indløsninger, rebalancerer investerings-
foreningerne deres porteføljer mod mere likvide aktiver. Dette resultat er stærkere n˚ar (1)
investeringsforeninger er i en oprindeligt svag likviditetsposition, og (2) n˚ar foreninger har
større eksponering mod usikkerhed, m˚alt ved det foreningsspeciﬁkke volatilitetsm˚al, som jeg
udvikler. Jeg viser, at disse resultater er robuste over for inkorporeringen af kontanter til at
analysere de samlede beslutninger omkring kontanter og aktie-aktiv volatilitet, og over for
at bruge variation drevet af markedsvolatilitet, der ikke er forudsigelig.
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Essay 2: Boligpriser og Skatter (medforfattet af Mads Gjedsted Nielsen)
Det andet essay fokuserer p˚a reaktionen af boligpriserne p˚a ændringer i kommune indkomst-
og ejendomskattesatser. For at kunne identiﬁcere den kausale sammenhæng imellem skatter
og huspriser, udnytter vi eksogen variation i de kommunale indkomst- og ejendomsskatter
introduceret af en kommunal reform i 2007.
Kommunalreformen i 2007 var introduceret for bedre at udnytte skalaøkonomier i kom-
munerne ved at sammenlægge mindre kommuner og derved danner større kommuner. Med
undtagelse af kun ﬁre sm˚a øer, skulle alle kommuner med færre end 20,000 sammenlægges
med en eller ﬂere kommuner for at danne en ny kommune med mindst 30,000 indbyg-
gere. Efter reformen skulle de sammenlagte kommuner sætte fælles udskrivningsprocent
og grundskyldspromille. Hvis kommuner ikke havde samme skattesatser før reformen, vil
de fælles skattesatser inducere ændringer i skattebetalingen for mindst en af de sammen-
lagte kommuner. Sammenlagte kommuner skulle sætte en skattesats som var lig med eller
under gennemsnittet for de sammenlagte kommuner, plus en justering for ændringer i de
velfærdsopgaver som kommunerne varetager. Vores identiﬁkationsstrategi benytter en ”two-
stage-least-squares” tilgang for at adressere mulige endogenitetsproblemer. Speciﬁkt, instru-
menterer vi post-reform skattesatserne med gennemsnittet af præ-reform skattersatserne i
de sammenlagte kommuner. Vi viser, at præ-reform gennemsnittet er tæt relateret til den
valgte skattesats og er uafhængig af enhver faktor som kunne tænkes at inﬂuere huspriserne,
s˚a som de økonomiske forhold i de enkelte kommuner.
Vi ﬁnder, at et 1%points stigning i indkomstskatten medfører et 7,9% fald i huspriserne
og et 1 -points stigning i ejendomsskatten medfører et 1.1% fald i huspriserne. Den simple
nutidsværdi af en permanent 1%-points stigning i indkomstskatten og en 1 -points stigning
i ejendomsskatten, relativt til medianhusprisen svarer til henholdsvis 7% og 3.3%. Vores
resultater er s˚aledes p˚a linie med de forudsagte værdier. Dette indikerer at boligmarkedet
forholdsvis eﬃcient inkorporer skatter i priserne.
Essay 3: Lokale Økonomiske Forhold og Lokale Aktiepræferencer:
Evidens fra Investeringsforeninger under det Amerikanske Bolig-
markeds Optur og Nedgang (medforfattet af Chandler Lutz og Ben
MacLean Sand)
Det tredje essay undersøger hvordan variationen i lokale økonomiske forhold p˚avirker fonds-
forvalteres porteføljeallokeringsbeslutninger og efterfølgende performance. Mens tidligere
forskning dokumenterer en stærk sammenhæng mellem forhold gældende for hele markedet
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(eksempelvis konjunkturcyklus) og fondsafkast, er der relativt lidt viden omkring eﬀekten
af lokale økonomiske forhold (her approksimeret af boligsprisstigninger). I særdeleshed kan
tidsvarierende lokale forhold forøge fondsforvalteres iboende fordomme og p˚avirke invester-
ingsforeningers performance.
Vores analyse viser at investeringsforeninger reagere p˚a ændringer i de lokale boligpriser
ved at justere graden af home-bias i deres aktieporteføljer; negative boligprischok for˚arsager
investeringsforeninger til at justere deres portefølje mod nærliggende aktieinvesteringer. Imi-
dlertid ﬁnder vi ikke, at boligprischok er relateret til hvad vi kalder ‘fonds materielle aktiver’
(net-ﬂows, likviditetspositioner, etc.). S˚aledes er forholdet imellem home-bias og bolig-
prischok, som vi dokumentere, ikke drevet af investorernes reaktion p˚a ændringer i de lokale
økonomiske forhold. Vi argumenterer for at aktivinformationsfordelen/genkendelighed ikke
er relateret til lokale boligprischok. S˚aledes tyder vores resultater p˚a en bias i fondsfor-
valteres opførsel, der ikke er relateret til information eller genkendelighed. Denne tidligere
udokumenterede adfærdsmæssige bias er af førsteordens vigtighed, eftersom ændringen i
investeringsforeningers præferencer mod lokale aktier induceret af en forværring i lokale
økonomiske forhold er associeret med fondsunderperformance.
Vores primære resultat er forringelsen af lokale økonomiske forhold er associeret med et
skift i fondsforvalteres præferencer for geograﬁske nærtliggende aktiver. Et et-procentpoints
fald i de lokale boligpriser medfører et fald i den gennemsnitlige afstand imellem en invester-
ingsforening og dens investeringer med 36 km og øger andelen af lokale aktiver med 0.73 pro-
centpoint. Vi undersøge ogs˚a konsekvensen af boligpris pris betingede porteføljeændringer i
form af fondsperfomance. Ved at sammenfører fondsperformance direkte med boligprischok
ﬁnder vi, at et et procentpoints fald i boligpriserne medfører et 25 bps og 51 bps fald i frem-
tidige henholdsvis 3 og 6 m˚aneders karakteristik-justeret afkast. Vi splitter derp˚a porteføl-
jerne op i lokale og fjerne aktier og beregner det fremtidige afkast for hver underportefølje.
Vi ﬁnder at underperformance er koncenteret om porteføljerne med lokale aktier. Til sidst
relatere vi fondsforvalteres home-bias til fremtidig fondsperformance. Vores ”two-stage-least-
squares” estimater antyder, at home-bias for˚arsager underperformance. En et-procentpoints
stigning i andelen af lokale aktier mindsker det 6 m˚aneders karakteristik-justerede afkast
med 69.9 basis points. Alt i alt viser vores resultater, at investeringsforeningers reaktion p˚a
boligprischok afspejler en respons p˚a opfattet risiko og fondsforvaltere ser lokale aktier som
værende sikrere, og denne adfærdsmæssige bias medfører d˚arligere fondsperformance.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays investigating ﬁnancial and real estate markets and iden-
tifying a relationship between them. A 2008 ﬁnancial crises provides a perfect example of
sizeable interactions between US housing market and equity prices, where a negative shock
to house prices triggered a word-wide recession. Therefore, understanding forces driving
investors behaviour and preferences, which in turn aﬀect asset prices in both equity and
housing market are of great interest.
Previous research document, that investors prefer liquid stocks and require an extra
compensation for investing in illiquid assets (Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and
Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud (2002)). Liquidity premium, which is the extra return
required for holding illiquid assets varies over time (Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003), Hagstro¨mer et al. 2013) and is correlated to measures of market
volatility (Nagel (2012)). In my ﬁrst essay, I contribute to the existing literature by providing
a demand side explanation for the relationship between market price of liquidity and market
uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, I argue that times of high uncertainty coincide with large market
declines. Consequently, investors have greater demands for liquidity and this places upward
price pressure on the liquidity premium.
In order to examine this causal chain, I exploit the structure suggested by Vayanos (2004).
I investigate an investor’s response to uncertainty with US open-end mutual funds data from
Morningstar. To analyse the eﬀect of mutual fund demand for liquidity, I construct a fund’s
active liquidity management measure, which isolates a change in a fund’s portfolio liquidity
directly under the fund manager’s control. Consistent with Vayanos (2004) theoretical
predictions, I show that uncertainty is associated with greater outﬂows from mutual funds.
Mutual funds respond to the greater threat of redemptions during times of uncertainty, by
shifting the composition of their portfolios towards more liquid assets - the so called ‘ﬂight-
to-liquidity’. As funds respond to an aggregate market conditions, the coordination of their
behaviour places downward price pressure on illiquid assets.
While existing research investigates the impact of market uncertainty on mutual fund
capital ﬂows (Ferson and Kim (2012) and Ederington and Golubeva (2011)), a direct link
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between uncertainty-induced fund behaviour and the market price of liquidity have not be
examined. My ﬁrst essay bridges this gap by showing one channel through which market
uncertainty impacts the liquidity premium. Furthermore, consistent with theoretical pre-
dictions of Ang et al. (2014), my paper contributes to the empirical asset pricing literature
by documenting liquidity targeting among US equity mutual funds. The novelty of my em-
pirical approach allows me to incorporate cash into active liquidity management measure
and analyse the joint decision regarding cash and equity asset liquidity.
Empirical investigation of forces and drivers in housing market have been partly con-
strained by a lack of available data, because most of real estate is privately traded. A proper
identiﬁcation of a causal relationship requires a controlled experiment in order to address
any endogeneity concern inherent in the analysis of the prices on quantities. The 2007
municipal reform in Denmark provides a unique laboratory to asses the impact of income
and property taxes on residential house prices. In my second essay (co-authored with Mads
Gjedsted Nielsen), we eploit the exogenous variation in municipal income and property tax
rates to identify causal relationship between taxes and house prices.
The main purpose of the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark was to increase economies
of scale at the municipal level by merging smaller municipalities. With the exemption
of only four small islands, all municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants had to merge with
one or more nearby municipalities in order to create a new municipality of at least 30,000
inhabitants. The merged municipalities were required to jointly set a new tax rate. The new
tax rates equal to or lower than an average of the previous tax rates plus an adjustment for
changes in the public service task handled by the municipalities. Our identiﬁcation strategy
uses two-stage least square approach in order to address potential endogeneity issues. We
instrument the tax rates after the reform with the average of previous tax rates in the
merging municipalities, since this average is closely related to the chosen tax rate, and is
independent of any factors that might inﬂuence house prices, like the economic situation in
the municipality.
We ﬁnd that a 1%-point increase in the income tax rate lead to a drop in house prices
of 7.9% and a 1 -point increase in the property tax rate lead to a 1.1% drop in house
prices. The simple present value of a 1%-point perpetual income tax increase and of a 1 -
point property tax increase, relative to the median house price correspond to 7% and 3.3%,
respectively. Our ﬁndings are thus in line with predicted values. Our analysis provide a
support to the ﬁndings of Palmon and Smith (1998) about eﬃcient incorporation of taxes
into house prices.
In the third essay (co-authored with Chandler Lutz and Ben MacLean Sand), we study
how local house market shocks aﬀect a mutual fund asset allocation decision. We contribute
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to the empirical asset pricing literature by investigating a potential source of investor’s home
bias. While existing research remains divided on the origin of home bias, we argue that
funds’ time-varying preferences towards local stocks cannot be explained by informational
advantages or manager’s familiarity.
In our analysis, we ﬁnd that mutual funds respond to local house market shocks by
shifting the degree of home bias in their equity portfolios; negative house price shocks
cause funds to tilt their portfolio in favour of nearby equity holdings. However, we do
not ﬁnd that housing price shocks are related to what we call ‘fund tangibles’ (net-ﬂows,
liquidity position, etc.). Thus, the relationship between the home bias and house price
shocks that we document is not being driven by fund investors’ reaction to a change in
local economic conditions. We argue that asset information advantage or familiarity are
unrelated to local housing price shocks. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest a bias in fund manager
behaviour that is unrelated to information or familiarity. This previously undocumented
behavioural bias is of ﬁrst-order importance, as the shift in mutual fund preferences towards
local stocks induced by deterioration in local economic conditions is associated with mutual
fund underperformance.
This paper contributes to the literature along a number of dimensions. Our primary
contribution is to show that a variation in local economic conditions aﬀect mutual fund
managers’ preferences towards geographically proximate assets. We also document a strong
shift towards safer and higher quality stocks in face of locally decreasing house prices. Last
but not least, we argue that our analysis provides evidence of previously undocumented
behavioural bias. We ﬁnd that deterioration in local economic condition induced shift in
preferences towards local assets is associated with a signiﬁcant decrease in a fund’s perfor-
mance. Symmetry of our results suggest that fund manager react to positive shocks to local
house market by investing in what they are not familiar with. These results undermine in-
formational advantage and manager’s familiarity as potential explanations for time-varying
home bias among mutual funds. Overall, our evidence highlights the importance of local
economic conditions in fund managers’ asset allocation decision making.
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Essay 1
Mutual fund ﬂight-to-liquidity1
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Abstract
This paper examines the liquidity choices of mutual funds during times of market
uncertainty. I ﬁnd that when markets are uncertain, mutual funds actively increase
the liquidity of their portfolio – often referred to as a ‘ﬂight-to-liquidity.’ In aggregate,
mutual fund behaviour has implications for the market; the market driven ﬂight-to-
liquidity places upward pressure on the liquidity premium. I examine the underlying
mechanisms driving fund behaviour. I show that market volatility is associated with
lower fund performance and withdrawals, which causes funds to adjust the composition
of their portfolio towards more liquid assets in order to meet potential redemptions.
This causal chain is consistent with Vayanos (2004), who argues that fund managers
are investors with time-varying liquidity preferences due to threat of withdrawal. Ag-
gregated over funds, the eﬀect is substantial: a one standard deviation increase in my
measure of ﬂight-to-liquidity yields a 0.63 standard deviation increase in the excess
return required for holding illiquid securities.
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1.1 Introduction
A stock’s liquidity and how its liquidity evolves over time are a primary concern to in-
vestors. Recent studies show that investors prefer more liquid stocks and expect an extra
compensation for holding an illiquid asset (Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and
Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud (2002)). Similarly, market makers need compensation for
providing liquidity to investors and they charge a higher price if a traded asset is less liquid.
This excess return required by both investors and market makers for bearing liquidity risk,
which is called the liquidity premium, not only varies over time (Acharya and Pedersen
(2005), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), or Hagstro¨mer et al. 2013), but it is also correlated
to measures of market uncertainty. However, the mechanism driving this association is not
well understood:
The fact that expected returns from liquidity provision are strongly related to the VIX
index does not necessarily imply that the VIX index itself is the state variable driving
expected returns from liquidity provision. More likely, the VIX proxies for the under-
lying state variables that drive the willingness of market makers to provide liquidity
and the public’s demand for liquidity. (Nagel (2012), p.2008)
In this paper, I investigate one channel through which market uncertainty aﬀects the
liquidity premium. Whereas Nagel (2012) relates the price of liquidity to its supply, I
explore a demand-side explanation. In particular, I argue that times of high uncertainty
coincide with large market declines. Consequently, retail investors have greater demands for
liquidity and this places upward pressure on the liquidity premium.2 While I cannot directly
observe an investor’s demand for liquidity, it can be partly inferred from mutual funds’ net
ﬂows. This is due to the fact that mutual funds provide liquidity to their shareholders
. Consistent with this idea, I show that uncertainty is associated with greater outﬂows
from mutual funds. Mutual funds, responding to the greater threat of redemptions during
times of uncertainty, shift the composition of their portfolios toward more liquid assets –
the so called ‘ﬂight-to-liquidity.’3 As funds respond to an aggregate market condition, the
coordination of their behaviour places downward price pressure on illiquid assets. The eﬀect
is substantial: a one standard deviation in my measure of ﬂight-to-liquidity causes a 0.63
standard deviation increase in the market price of liquidity.
2See e.g. Bernardo and Welch (2004) and Morris and Shin (2004).
3A related and recent paper by Huang (2014) provides empirical evidence of an association between
expected market volatility and the liquidity of mutual fund holdings. My paper builds on this evidence by
exploring the underlying mechanism driving this association and relating mutual fund liquidity management
to the market level price of liquidity.
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In order to examine the link between market uncertainty and the price of liquidity,
I draw on insight from Vayanos (2004). In his model, investors withdraw their money
if a fund performs poorly, which is more likely during times of high market uncertainty.
Consequently, redemption obligations increase when markets are volatile and fund managers
put the value of ﬂexibility before its cost by adjusting portfolios toward liquid assets. Market
uncertainty induces an aggregate shift in mutual fund demand for liquidity, which feedbacks
into the market price for liquidity and generates time-variation in the liquidity premium.
My empirical analysis exploits the structure suggested by Vayanos (2004) to examine this
causal chain.
I investigate a mutual fund’s response to uncertainty with US open-ended mutual funds
data from Morningstar. In these data mutual funds actively invest in US equity between
January 1998 and December 2013. A key variable in my analysis, which I refer to as ‘active
liquidity management,’ is a measure of how funds actively manage the liquidity of their
portfolios by adjusting the composition of their assets. I construct this variable by ﬁrst
computing a fund’s monthly portfolio liquidity as a weighted average of the holdings Ami-
hud’s (2002) liquidity measure, where the weights are a fraction of the portfolio invested in
each stock. The change in a fund’s portfolio liquidity between two months can be decom-
posed via a common shift-share analysis.4 This decomposition represents a shift in portfolio
liquidity from two distinct sources: (1) shifts due to a change in the liquidity of the holdings
(the Amihud measure), and (2) shifts due to active modiﬁcation of a portfolio’s composition
in terms of holdings. This second component is my measure of a fund’s active liquidity
management, since it isolates the change in a portfolio’s liquidity directly under the fund
manager’s control.
In Vayanos’s (2004) model, a key factor impacting a fund’s liquidity preference is the
threat of withdrawal, which is increasing in market volatility. Thus, a key relationship in
my analysis is how a fund’s active liquidity management responds to net ﬂows, which I
examine in a regression framework. In doing so, I attempt to control for possible confound-
ing factors, such as variables that capture overall market performance and the availability
of liquidity, seasonality and year ﬁxed-eﬀects, and also for a complete, unrestricted set of
fund-level ﬁxed eﬀects. These latter variables are meant to capture possible time-invariant
fund characteristics. Using this set of controls, I identify the eﬀect of net ﬂows on liquidity
management by focusing on within-fund and within-year, over-time variation. The OLS
estimates of this relationship suggest that funds are unresponsive to net ﬂows. However,
while fund ﬁxed eﬀects mitigate the problem of possible correlation between net ﬂows and
4Shift-share allows to decompose the change in a weighted mean into one part that is due to a change in
the weights and another part that is due to the change in the underlying variable (Dunn, 1960).
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fund time-invariant factors, there is still a potential endogeneity concern arising from omit-
ted time-varying variables that are correlated with fund ﬂows, such as time-varying skills
(Kacperczyk et al. (2014)). To overcome this potential identiﬁcation issue, and to focus on
variation in net ﬂows stemming from market uncertainty, I exploit the structure of Vayanos’s
model which suggests a natural instrumental variable – market volatility.
A two-stage estimation procedure arises naturally from the structure of the model, which
predicts that net ﬂows are negatively impacted by market uncertainty, causing funds to
adjust portfolio liquidity. The ﬁrst-stage relates net ﬂows to market uncertainty, which
is measured in my baseline empirical work by a realized market volatility estimator, and
controls for the same variables as above. I ﬁnd that realized volatility strongly predicts
outﬂows from equity mutual funds, a necessary requirement for the instrumental variables
estimation procedure. This result is both consistent with the model and with existing
literature.5 In the ﬁrst-stage regression, a one standard deviation shock to market volatility
decreases aggregate fund ﬂows by 0.4%. Following Vayanos’s (2004) framework, I show that
this eﬀect is partly explained by a deterioration in a fund’s performance when markets are
more volatile.
The second-stage relates a fund’s active liquidity management to variation in net ﬂows
induced by market uncertainty. In contrast to the OLS estimates, I ﬁnd that by isolating
the variation in fund net ﬂows stemming only from market volatility, mutual funds strongly
respond to redemption obligations by actively managing the liquidity of their portfolio. A
one standard deviation decrease in fund’s net ﬂows causes a 1.9 standard deviation increase
in actively managed portfolio’s liquidity. This estimate is robust to market-wide returns and
liquidity, and focuses on within-year variation. Thus, the identifying variation comes from
shifts in realized market volatility holding market-wide performance and liquidity constant.
In order for the instrumental variables procedure to yield causal estimates of mutual fund
responses to uncertainty, my maintained assumption is that these shifts in realized volatility,
above and beyond a rigorous set of controls for market performance, are exogenous to
mutual funds. While this assumption is plausible, since individual funds are small relative
to the market as a whole, I also show that the results are robust to using variation in
realized volatility that is not forcastable by US CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), which I
call a ‘volatility shock.’ This robustness check ensures that my results are not driven by
anticipatory behaviour.
These results demonstrate that mutual funds respond to negative shocks to their ﬂows
induced by market uncertainty by increasing the liquidity of their portfolios. In aggregate,
5For example, Ederington and Golubeva (2011) and Ferson and Kim (2012) show a negative relationship
between future expected volatility and net aggregate equity fund ﬂows.
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the time-varying liquidity preferences of mutual funds can contribute to the time-varying
nature of the market price of liquidity (Vayanos (2004)). To examine this link, I measure
the market liquidity premium as the additive inverse of the diﬀerence between illiquid and
liquid portfolio returns, following Jensen and Moorman (2010). I relate this to mutual
fund demand for liquidity, which I calculate by aggregating my measure of active liquidity
management over funds in each period. The association between these two variables is
strong and is consistent with the model’s predictions. In order to address any endogeneity
concern inherent in the analysis of the prices on quantities, I use market volatility in an
instrumental variable approach. By only using the variation in aggregate active liquidity
management stemming from market uncertainty, I show that a volatility-induced shift in
preferences towards more liquid assets exerts downward price pressure on illiquid stocks,
which is reﬂected in the narrowing of the measured return spread. A one standard deviation
increase in actively managed portfolio’s liquidity decreases the return spread by 2.13%.
Thus, a major contribution of my paper is that it provides a partial explanation for the
observed relationship between the liquidity premium and market uncertainty found in the
literature.
In my baseline analysis I use only equity holdings information to study a mutual fund’s
response to the threat of withdrawal. In reality, cash is an important component of a fund
active liquidity management. Thus, I incorporate information on cash holdings into my
analysis. First, I treat a cash holdings decision separately from liquidity management of
equity holdings. I show that fund managers increase the percentage of the portfolio held
in cash when they face the threat of redemptions, consistent with Huang (2014). However,
treating cash and equity decisions separately is incorrect if there is strategic interaction
between those two decisions. I respond to this diﬃculty by incorporating both cash and
equity into a fund’s portfolio by treating cash as any other equity position when measuring
active liquidity management. The novelty of my approach is that it allows for the analysis
of the joint decisions regarding cash and equity asset liquidity. I assign the Amihud measure
of zero to cash and use weights equal to the fraction of a portfolio held in the form of cash.
After incorporating cash into a fund’s active liquidity management, I show that the response
to uncertainty remains unchanged.
One potential weakness of my analysis is that it relies on over-time variation that is
common to all funds. However, funds diﬀer from one another in terms of the composition of
their holdings. This diﬀerence will translate into diﬀerences in exposure to market volatility,
which is measured as the volatility of the S&P 500. In order to assess the importance of this,
I create a fund-speciﬁc volatility measure that is based on the composition of assets the funds
actually hold. For each mutual fund, I measure the fraction of the portfolio invested in one
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of the ten GICS sectors, and construct a fund-speciﬁc uncertainty measure by estimating
the value-weighted average of Garman and Klass’s (1980) sector realized volatility. This
method allows both over-time and between-fund variation to be exploited in my analysis.
I ﬁnd that mutual funds react stronger to my fund-speciﬁc volatility measure compared to
the market one. This implies that my results based on market volatility are conservative,
since fund reaction depends on their portfolio exposure. This result is new to the literature.
A possible source of heterogeneity of a fund’s response to market uncertainty comes from
the diﬀerences in its initial liquidity position. Funds that happen to be more illiquid when
market volatility increases are expected to have stronger reactions since it is more diﬃcult
for them to meet redemptions. To investigate this, I develop a measure of ‘illiquidity shock’
for each fund. This variable is deﬁned as a percentage change in a portfolio’s liquidity due
to a change in the market-wide Amihud measure of the assets, holding investment shares
ﬁxed. The idea behind this variable is that it captures shocks to a fund’s liquidity position
that are exogenous to management decisions at a speciﬁc date. In fact, this measure arises
naturally in my shift-share decomposition of a fund’s average Amihud changes. I show
that mutual funds actively manage the liquidity of their portfolio not only in times of high
market uncertainty, but also when they face an illiquidity shock. This ﬁnding suggests that
managers target the liquidity of their portfolio. While this result is consistent with the
theoretical predictions of Ang et al. (2014), empirically establishing evidence of a liquidity
targeting in the case of mutual funds is a new contribution to the literature. I also show
that mutual funds experiencing an illiquidity shock respond stronger to market uncertainty,
meaning that they more aggressively tilt their portfolio towards liquid stocks.
My paper contributes to the literature along a number of dimensions. My primary
contribution is to show that aggregate mutual fund active liquidity management, driven by
market volatility, inﬂuences the market price of liquidity. Underlying this ﬁnding at the
aggregate level, I show a strong and robust response of mutual funds to market volatility
that uncovers the fundamental mechanisms driving this aggregate response. First, I establish
that market uncertainty is associated with lower fund performance and withdrawals. Second,
in response to the threat of withdrawals, funds actively rebalance their portfolios toward
more liquid assets. This ﬁnding is stronger when (1) funds are in an initially weak liquidity
position, and (2) when funds have greater exposure to uncertainty, as captured by the
fund-speciﬁc volatility measure that I develop. I establish that these ﬁndings are robust to
incorporation of cash to analyse the joint decisions regarding cash and equity asset liquidity,
and to using variation driven by market volatility that is not forcastable.
A number of studies are related to this work. First, as noted above, my empirical work is
guided by the theoretical model of Vayanos (2004). The empirical focus of my work is related
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to Huang (2014) and Ben-Rephael (2014). However, in contrast to these papers, which
estimate reduced form relationships, I provide a mechanism explaining mutual fund ﬂight-
to-liquidity by more formally investigating Vayanos (2004), and relate fund responses to the
market price of liquidity. Ben-Rephael (2014)’s identiﬁcation comes from times of crisis,
whereas my paper’s identiﬁcation is general, and comes from within-year shifts in market
volatility. Thus, I show that ﬂow-induced changes in mutual fund liquidity preferences
are reﬂected in the time-varying market price of liquidity more generally, and are not just
isolated to times of crisis. I use market uncertainty as the main driver of mutual fund
ﬂight-to-liquidity. Beber et al. (2009) also condition their analysis on market uncertainty
and they show a shift in liquidity preferences of sovereign bond investors when market
volatility is high. I show that market volatility aﬀects mutual fund demand for liquidity,
which is in line with the prediction of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) that increases in
market volatility coincide with liquidity dry-ups. Whereas my study investigates the impact
of the threat of withdrawals on mutual fund active liquidity management, Liu and Mello
(2011) analyse optimal asset allocation for hedge funds in the face of possible coordinated
redemptions. There is also a series of papers examining the eﬀect of mutual fund ﬂows
on concurrent stock returns. However, none of these explain the time-varying nature of
liquidity premium with ﬂow-induced trading. Lou (2012) shows that ﬂow-induced trading
can explain stock price momentum. Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) relates price volatility
and the co-movement in stock returns to the trades of distressed mutual fund and their
spill-over eﬀects. Coval and Staﬀord (2007) demonstrate that ﬂow-induced transactions of
funds experiencing substantial in- and outﬂows exert price pressure on their traded holdings,
thus providing liquidity to those constrained funds can be very proﬁtable.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I relate my analysis to the existing
literature. In section 3.2, I describe the data and the variable construction in detail. In
Section 3.4, I explain estimation approach and report the empirical results. In Section 1.5,
I show the robustness of my results. Section 3.5 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to, and builds on, three distinct lines of literature. First, my paper
contributes to a large and growing literature that focuses on liquidity dry-ups with evidence
of a causal mechanism related to investor behaviour. The second contribution of the paper
lies in an examining investor’s portfolio liquidity choices, which is related to a literature
that began with the seminal paper of Constantinides (1986). Finally, my paper adds to the
literature discussing the asset pricing implications of investor behaviour.
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1.2.1 Liquidity Dry-Ups
My study relates to the growing literature on times of liquidity dry-ups. Much of the
literature discusses the mechanism leading to periods of evaporating liquidity. For example,
Bernardo and Welch (2004) model liquidity runs, where investors fear future liquidity shocks
and prefer to sell today in order to receive an average price. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) provide a model with a feedback relationship between assets’ market liquidity and
investors’ funding liquidity. They predict that increases in market volatility coincide with
drops in market liquidity, because of market-makers’ limited liquidity provision. Malherbe
(2014) proposes an adverse selection liquidity model, where holding cash imposes a negative
externality, reducing future market liquidity and causing liquidity dry-ups.6
There is little empirical evidence on investors’ behaviour in times of liquidity crises.
Beber et al. (2009) focus on the importance of the quality and the liquidity for the de-
termination of sovereign yield spreads. They show changes in a credit quality can explain
sovereign yield spreads to a large extent. However, in times of market uncertainty liquidity
of sovereign bonds is the main driver of the yield spreads.7 My study builds on this existing
literature by analysing liquidity preferences of equity mutual funds in times of high market
volatility, which in turn coincide with liquidity dry-up periods.
1.2.2 Portfolio Choices with Trading Costs
Several theoretical studies investigate investors’ portfolio choices in the presence of trading
costs. Ang et al. (2014) propose a model of an optimal allocation between liquid and illiq-
uid assets. The liquidity risk comes from periods of an uncertain duration, where illiquid
assets cannot be traded and consumption can only be funded by a liquid part of the port-
folio. They show, among others, that investors have an optimal portfolio composition of
liquid and illiquid assets (ξ∗), to which they rebalance whenever it is possible. The portfolio
management in times of crisis constitutes the main focus of a growing number of empirical
studies. Manconi et al. (2012) look at institutional bond holders in 2007. They ﬁnd that
liquidity-constrained mutual funds contribute to the transmission of the crises from securi-
tized bonds to corporate bonds. Huang (2014) shows in a reduced form that mutual funds
have liquidity preferences in times of market uncertainty and their liquidity management
is reﬂected in fund performance. Ben-Rephael (2014) analyses ten episodes of volatility
shocks. He shows that mutual funds on average sell more illiquid than liquid stocks and
illiquid assets experience a greater price discount than liquid ones during crisis periods.
6See also Gennotte and Leland (1990), Huang and Wang (2009), and Krishnamurthy (2010).
7See also Longstaﬀ (2004).
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My empirical study is closely related to the model of Vayanos (2004). In the theoretical
framework, he proposes a link between volatility-induced performance and net ﬂows that, in
turn, aﬀect a fund’s behaviour. The probability of fund performance falling below a bench-
mark increases with volatility. Fund investors monitor the performance and they withdraw
their money when the performance drops below the threshold. Since mutual fund managers
fear the redemptions, they require higher risk premium per unit of volatility and are less
willing to keep illiquid stocks in their portfolio. In consequence, illiquid stocks experience
greater price discount what is reﬂected in an increase in market liquidity premium. The
threat of the redemptions is also a main driver of an institutional investor portfolio alloca-
tion in the study of Liu and Mello (2011). They propose a model on portfolio choices of
hedge funds up against the risk of coordinated withdrawals. There is a trade-oﬀ between
higher returns and greater liquidation costs that determines an optimal level of cash hold-
ings. However, hedge fund managers choose a suboptimal (too high) level of cash as a result
of their fear of coordinated redemptions.8 My empirical analysis focuses on equity mutual
fund portfolio composition in face of a threat of withdrawal. Consistent with the existing
literature, I show that mutual fund managers target the liquidity of their portfolio and in
face of threat of withdrawals they shift towards more liquid assets.
1.2.3 Asset Pricing Implications of Funds’ Behaviour
This paper shows a relationship between volatility induced fund active asset allocation and
market liquidity premium. Thus, my analysis also relates to the literature that focuses on
an explanation of market predictabilities with mutual fund trading which is induced by
investors’ ﬂows and managers correlated behaviour. Coval and Staﬀord (2007) provides a
rational explanation for the deviation of stock prices from its fundamental value. They show
that mutual fund transactions triggered by both large out- and inﬂows can push prices away
from their intrinsic value. Investors trading against those distress funds can generate a high
return from providing liquidity. Lou (2012) explains the return momentum and reversal by
means of expected ﬂow-induced trading.9 Finally, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2007) develop a
theoretical framework, where they link market liquidity and risk-management practices of
institutional investors. They show that in case of high market volatility, or reduced risk-
bearing capacity a feedback relationship between risk-management and market liquidity
can arise. As a result of tighter risk-management the prices of illiquid stocks decrease and
8Chernenko and Sunderam (2015) show that cash holdings play a signiﬁcant role in accommodation of
mutual fund in- and outﬂows.
9See for return comovement - Anto´n and Polk (2014) and Greenwood and Thesmar (2011), liquidity
comovement - Koch et al. (2010).
16
the market price of liquidity increases. My empirical analysis provides evidence that stock
prices can deviate from their intrinsic value because of investor demand unrelated to the
fundamentals. In line with the existing literature, I show that mutual fund transactions
induced by the threat of withdrawal put upward price pressure on the liquidity premium.
1.3 Data and Variable Construction
In this section, I introduce my data source and processing procedures. I also explain the
construction of the variables used for my analysis and I discuss descriptive statistics.
1.3.1 Mutual fund and stock data
I use monthly mutual fund holdings obtained from Morningstar database for the period of
1998-2013. The data is complied from both mandatory SEC ﬁlings and voluntary disclosures.
Elton et al. (2010) provide a comparison of the Morningstar holdings data with the more
frequently used data from Thomson Reuters. They conclude that Morningstar is without
survivorship bias and it captures 18.5% more trades than Thomson Reuters database does.
Since this paper focuses on the impact of mutual fund active asset allocation on the US
equity market, I include domestic mutual funds actively investing in US equity.
Mutual funds’ total net assets (TNA), net returns, net ﬂows, cash holdings and other
fund characteristics are also obtained from Morningstar database. For mutual funds with
multiple share classes, I calculate the TNA-weighted average of net returns (cash holdings)
across all share classes to derive the net return (cash holdings) of the fund. Mutual fund
net ﬂows are already available at the fund level.
The stock data (daily returns, prices, trading volumes and shares outstanding) for com-
mon shares (share code 10 and 11) are obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). I require each stock to have at least 15 days of return and dollar volume data
in a month. I use CUSIP identiﬁcation number to merge mutual fund holdings information
with CRSP stock database. I include only those mutual funds with 70% of their holdings
value identiﬁed as a common US equity and successfully merged with CRSP dataset. In
order to measure market uncertainty, I obtain daily information on open, close, high, and
low price for S&P 500 index from Finance Yahoo website, and daily VIX observation from
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).10
After applying these screening procedures, I obtain a sample of 85,560 fund-month obser-
vations on 1,601 diﬀerent mutual funds. Table 1.1 shows summary statistics of the mutual
10https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^GSPC and http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/
historical.aspx.
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funds’ main characteristics for each year. The number of mutual funds in the sample in-
creases from 169 in 1998 to 1,006 in 2013. The median TNA varies over time between 252.05
million in 2003 and 765.16 million in 1998. The number of diﬀerent stocks held across all
mutual funds in my sample increases from 2,285 in 1998 to 3,908 in 2007. There is some
skewness in the number of stocks held by mutual funds, meaning that there are few mutual
funds with numerous stocks in their portfolio. The median number of stocks per fund is
between 64 and 90. The last column in Table 1.1 shows the percentage of the holdings value
that has been successfully merged with common stocks from CRSP dataset.
1.3.2 Variable construction
Illiquidity measure
A stock’s liquidity is unobservable. Out of many liquidity proxies I choose Amihud’s (2002)
measure.11 Following Amihud (2002), I deﬁne the illiquidity of a stock s on the day d as:
Illiqs,d =
|Rs,d|
Vs,d
, (1.1)
where Rs,d is stock s return on day d and Vs,d is its dollar volume. I use monthly frequency
of mutual fund holdings, thus I estimate monthly stock liquidity by averaging Amihud’s
(2002) daily measure in month t:
Illiqs,t =
√√√√ 1
Ds,t
Ds,t∑
d=1
Illiqs,d, (1.2)
where Ds,t is the number of observation for stock s in month t. To reduce the inﬂuence of
extreme observations, I choose a square-root transformation.12 I use a stock-level liquidity
measure to compute a monthly value-weighted illiquidity measure at the mutual fund level:
Illiqf,t =
Sf,t∑
s=1
ωsf,t · Illiqs,t, (1.3)
where Sf,t is the number of stocks held by mutual fund f in the month t, and ω
s
f,t is a
fraction of the portfolio of fund f in month t held in stock s.
11Hasbrouck (2009) shows that out of liquidity measures, which he tested, square-root transformation of
Amihud measure is the most strongly correlated liquidity proxy with TAQ-based price impact coeﬃcient.
12I use the square-root transformation, because it enables me to include cash holdings into the behaviour
measure in the later part of my analysis. My results are robust to other Amihud measure transforma-
tions. Chordia et al. (2009), Hasbrouck (2009), and Chen et al. (2010), among others, use the square-root
transformation of Amihud measure as well.
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Existing studies show that market volatility aﬀects a stock’s liquidity (e.g. Chung and
Chuwonganant (2014), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)).13 Furthermore, the liquidity
of a fund’s portfolio can change between two months for two reason: its holdings become
more or less liquid, and a fund manager actively manages liquidity of the portfolio by
trading securities. In order to separate these two eﬀects I perform a shift-share analysis by
decomposing the change in portfolio’s liquidity into two components. The ﬁrst component
captures shifts due to a change in the liquidity of the holdings (Amihud measure), and the
second corresponds to shifts in the active modiﬁcation of a portfolio’s composition in terms
of holdings. I decompose the change in a fund’s portfolio liquidity in the following way:
ΔIlliqf,t =
Sf,t∑
s=1
ωsf,t · Illiqs,t −
Sf,t−1∑
s=1
ωsf,t−1 · Illiqs,t−1 (1.4)
=
Sf,t−1∑
s=1
ωsf,t−1
(
Illiqs,t − Illiqs,t−1
)
+
Sf,t∑
s=1
Illiqs,t
(
ωsf,t − ωsf,t−1
)
.
The ﬁrst term denotes the change in a portfolio’s liquidity due to a market-wide change
in individual stock’s Amihud measure. The second term is my measure of a fund’s active
liquidity management Bft , which is obtained by isolating the component of the change in
a portfolio’s liquidity directly under the fund manager’s control. It reﬂects the change in
the value of holdings composition as a consequence of asset purchases and sales actively
performed by fund’s manager.
One challenge with the data is to disentangle an investor’s demand for liquidity from her
demand for quality. Beber et al. (2009) show that investors’ demand for safety and liquidity
at the bond market changes over time. In times of market distress investors chase liquidity
rather than credit quality. I use a stock’s quality measure constructed by Asness et al.
(2013) to control for a portfolio’s quality.14 The quality measure captures four dimensions
of quality: proﬁtability, growth, safety, and pay. For each mutual fund every month, I
calculate a value-weighted quality rank Qualityft (eq. 1.3) and use it as a fund level control
variable.
13Chung and Chuwonganant (2014) shows that the liquidity of a single stock is strongly related both to its
own risk and to the level of uncertainty in the market as a whole. In their theoretical model, Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009) also predict that increases in VIX coincide with drops in market liquidity, because
market-maker’s liquidity provision is limited when the market volatility is high.
14I am grateful to Lasse Heje Pedersen for sharing with me their quality measure.
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Fund performance and investors ﬂows
In Vayanos’s (2004) model, an investor withdrawals from a mutual fund, when a fund’s
performance falls below a given threshold. As the threshold is not precisely deﬁned, I use
the S&P 500 index as the benchmark. The S&P 500 index seems to be a natural choice, as
even daily newspapers deliver information about its performance on a regular basis. I deﬁne
mutual fund f performance in month t as:
Perf f,t = Rf,t −RM,t, (1.5)
where Rf,t is mutual fund monthly return net of management, administrative, and 12b-1
fees and RM,t is the return on S&P500 index in month t.
Morningstar provides estimated fund-level net ﬂows (MFlow ft ) at the monthly frequency.
15
I compute the relative net ﬂows in order to capture the percentage of money ﬂowing into
and out of a mutual fund relative to its total assets:
Flow f,t =
MFlow f,t
TNAf,t−1
, (1.6)
where TNAf,t−1 is a total net asset of the fund f in the previous month.
Market level variables
I use historical market volatility as a proxy for uncertainty measure. Following prior liter-
ature (e.g. Longstaﬀ et al. (2011)), I choose a standard way of estimating realized market
volatility proposed by Garman and Klass (1980). The Garman-Klass volatility estimator
can be calculated based on open-high-low-close prices (OHLC) of the S&P 500 index:
RVol t =
√√√√ Z
Dt
·
Dt∑
d=1
1
2
·
(
log
hd
ld
)2
− (2 · log(2)− 1) ·
(
log
cd
od
)2
, (1.7)
where hd, ld, od, and cd are high, low, open, and close prices of stock S&P 500 index on day
d. Z is the number of closing prices in a year, and Dt is the number of historical prices used
for the market volatility estimate in month t.
In the robust analysis, I use a non-forcastable part of market realized volatility. I obtain it
by regressing realized market volatility measure RVol t on its forecast for the current month.
I save the residuals Res(Vol)t from this regression and use them as the shock component
15An estimated fund-level net ﬂows are computed from aggregated share-class-based ﬂows if available,
otherwise estimated from surveyed fund size.
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of market volatility. I choose a monthly average of the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) daily
observations as my market volatility forecast because of its beneﬁcial characteristic of being
forward looking.16 VIX is also a well known measure for market risk and is sometimes called
an ‘investor fear gauge’.
Existing research shows that times of high market volatility are associated with periods of
liquidity dry-ups. According to Nagel (2012), a reduction in market-wide liquidity increases
the cost of providing liquidity and the risk of holding illiquid stocks. Vayanos (2004) predicts
that fund managers’ risk aversion increases with market uncertainty, thus they become less
willing to hold illiquid securities and require a higher return for bearing the costs and risks.
Consequently, illiquid stocks are especially aﬀected by the deterioration in market liquidity
and they experience sizeable price discounts. To capture time-varying liquidity premium,
I use the return diﬀerential between illiquid and liquid stocks that incorporate the price
movement of these securities. I construct the return spread by sorting all stocks every
month into ﬁve portfolios based on their mean liquidity over past 3 months, and calculate
the monthly value-weighted return for each portfolio. I create a zero-cost portfolio that is
long in the least liquid quintile and short in the most liquid one. A decrease in the return
on this portfolio indicates a drop in the price of illiquid securities, higher required return
for holding illiquid stocks, and an increase in the market price of liquidity.17
Summary statistics
Table 1.2 panel A with summary statistics for the constructed variables gives some in-
sights into mutual funds liquidity preferences. The mean (median) fund illiquidity is 31.015
(25.574), meaning that mutual funds invest in the top 12% of most liquid stocks.18 They
also prefer stocks of better quality in their portfolio with the mean (median) quality rank of
0.656 (0.657). They keep on average 3.2% of their holdings in the form of cash. An average
fund experiences monthly net cash ﬂows of 0.8% of TNA and generates an average return
of 0.08% above the return on the S&P500 index.
Panel B in table 1.2 shows the correlations between the main variables. The market
uncertainty measured by realized volatility is negatively correlated with fund relative per-
formance (-0.22), ﬂows (-0.32), and active liquidity management measure (-0.42), whereas
16CBOE Volatility Index was introduced by the Chicago Board Options Exchange in 1993. It was designed
to measure the market’s expectation of 30-day volatility implied by at-the-money S&P100 (VXO) option
prices. In 2003, a new VIX measure was launched, which is based on the S&P500 Index and is estimated as
a weighted average of call and put prices for a wide range of strike prices (source: http://www.cboe.com/
micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf).
17The return spread is an additive inverse of the proxied market liquidity premium.
18I obtain the value of 12% from assigning illiquidity ranks between zero and one for all stocks every
month and estimate a fund-level illiquidity rank.
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it is positively correlated with portfolio’s illiquidity (0.48). Performance is also negatively
correlated with the change in market-wide liquidity ΔNoiset (-0.19), whilst fund ﬂows co-
vary positively with market return RM,t. This strong negative relationship between realized
volatility and fund performance is also pronounced in Figure 1.1. The shaded areas de-
pict periods of high market volatility. This ﬁgure shows that mutual funds underperform
the market in times of high market uncertainty. The negative relationship between market
volatility and fund ﬂows is illustrated in Figure 1.2. Not surprisingly, the plot shows that
on average mutual funds experience inﬂows when market volatility is low, however when
market uncertainty increases investors withdraw their money from equity mutual funds.19
1.4 Estimation and Results
Following Vayanos (2004), I estimate a system of three equations. He shows that high
market uncertainty increases the probability of a fund’s performance falling below a given
threshold, which in turn, is associated with an increase in a fund’s redemption obligations.
Managers fear withdrawals, therefore they increase the liquidity of their portfolio and, at
the same time, they exert an upward price pressure on the market liquidity premium.
1.4.1 Estimation Setup
The ﬁrst step of the analysis examines whether there is a relationship between current
fund performance and its ﬂows. In Vayanos (2004), investors withdraw their money from
the mutual fund if its performance falls below a given benchmark. I estimate the impact
of a fund’s relative performance on ﬂows by running a regression of net ﬂows on current
performance, and a set of fund-speciﬁc and market-wide variables. I also control for fund
time-invariant characteristics, seasonality in the ﬂows, and across-year variation.20
Step 1:
Flow f,t = β0 + β1Perf f,t + β2Qf,t +X
′
tΩ + bf + bq + by + f,t, (1.8)
where Qf,t is a measure of a quality of funds’ holdings, Xt is a vector of market-wide control
variables such as return on market portfolio, market-wide liquidity, equity market liquidity,
funding liquidity and NBER recession period dummies, bf is a full set of unrestricted fund
ﬁxed eﬀects, bq are quarter of year speciﬁc intercepts to capture seasonal eﬀects, and by
19Ederington and Golubeva (2011) also ﬁnd a negative correlation between equity fund ﬂows and stock
market volatility. Ferson and Kim (2012) ﬁnd a negative correlation between market volatility and equity
fund ﬂows, but a positive relation between volatility and ﬂows to bond funds and money market funds.
20See Kamstra et al. (2014) for the evidence on the seasonality in mutual fund ﬂows.
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corresponds to year ﬁxed eﬀects.21
When analysing the impact of concurrent fund performance on its ﬂows, a possible
endogeneity problem arises. I address this with an instrumental variable approach. I use
exogeneous variation in realized market volatility as an instrument. This choice of the
instrument stems directly from the structure in Vayanos (2004).22 In the ﬁrst stage regression
I estimate the impact of market uncertainty on funds’ relative performance.
First stage:
Perf f,t = α0 + α1RVol t + α2Qf,t +X
′
tΛ + af + aq + ay + εf,t. (1.9)
I expect that increases in market uncertainty are associated with a deterioration in a fund’s
performance and outﬂows from equity mutual funds. My supposition is in line with existing
studies of French et al. (1987) and Campbell and Hentschel (1992) who show that periods
of high volatility are associated with downward market movements.
After showing that my ﬁrst conjecture is supported by the data, I investigate whether
there is a link between a fund’s active liquidity management and the threat of withdrawal.
I deﬁne the active liquidity management as the part of the decomposed change in the fund’s
illiquidity from equation (1.4), that is fully determined by the manager’s portfolio allocation
decision, Bf,t.
Step 2:
Bf,t = γ0 + γ1Flow f,t + γ2Qf,t +X
′
tΓ + gf + gq + gy + ξf,t. (1.10)
In the last step, I examine whether a mutual fund’s aggregate liquidity preferences in-
duced by market uncertainty feedback into market level of liquidity pricing and contributes
to the time-varying nature of the liquidity premium. I expect that mutual funds’ shift to-
ward more liquid assets in times of high market volatility exert a downward price pressure
on illiquid asset. Consequently, the measured return diﬀerential between liquid and illiquid
stocks decreases and the market price of liquidity increases. To test my conjecture, I regress
the return on the zero cost portfolio on the aggregate mutual fund’s active liquidity man-
21I use S&P 500 return as a proxy for market portfolio return. Hu et al. (2013) suggest a noise mea-
sure, which captures daily deviations of coupon-bearing Treasury securities’ market yields from the model
yields. They show that their measure is informative about liquidity conditions of diﬀerent (market) ori-
gins. The noise data is available at: http://www.mit.edu/~junpan/Noise_Measure.xlsx. I use Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003) measure for equity market liquidity from: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/
lubos.pastor/research/liq_data_1962_2014.txt and TED spread (the diﬀerence between 3-Month LI-
BOR based on US dollars and 3-Month Treasury Bill) as a measure for funding liquidity from: https:
//research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TEDRATE/downloaddata. The recession periods are taken
from the NBER website: http://www.nber.org/cycles.html.
22Section 1.4.2 discusses the endogeneity issue more detailed.
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agement measure and other control variables.23
Step 3:
LP t = δ0 + δ1Bt + δ3Qt +X
′
tΘ+ dq + dy + υt, (1.11)
where LP t is a return on a zero cost portfolio, which is long in illiquid stocks and short in
liquid ones, Bt denotes the aggregate measure of mutual fund’s active liquidity management,
computed by combining individual fund holdings information.
1.4.2 Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable
Estimation of the OLS system of equations, described in the previous sub-section, raises
a potential endogeneity issue. In the ﬁrst step in equation 1.8, simultaneity bias (reverse
causation) might arise between fund performance and its ﬂows, resulting in the correlation
between fund performance and the error term εf,t. Thus, one of the major concerns is to
consistently identify the α1 coeﬃcient from equation 1.8. Most studies ignore the endogene-
ity issue because of the diﬃculty in ﬁnding plausible instruments, but exceptions include
Reuter and Zitzewitz (2010) and Phillips et al. (2013) who use an exogenous shock to over-
come the endogeneity bias between a fund performance and ﬂows. Following Christoﬀersen
et al. (2014), who review academic papers studying ﬂows to asset managers, I consider
several potential sources of bias. Investors come to a decision about their (dis)investment
based on a fund’s performance. A well performing fund attracts more capital, whereas in-
vestors withdraw their money from a bad performing one. The impact of the performance
on investors ﬂows have been studied by Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), among
others. They analyse the relationship from a perspective of performance determining the
ﬂows. On the other hand, Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) focus on smart money eﬀect,
where fund ﬂows can predict future performance. Christoﬀersen et al. (2014) also consider
two other channels, through which ﬂows inﬂuence the performance: diseconomies of scale
(fund performance decreases with the fund size) and direct cost of ﬂows (e.g. the front run-
ning costs - Coval and Staﬀord (2007) and incurred transaction costs reducing the average
fund’s performance - Edelen (1999)).
In order to estimate a fund’s response to the redemption obligations, I regress a fund’s
active liquidity management measure on its net ﬂows, a set of control variables and quarter
of a year dummy variable to capture seasonality. By including fund ﬁxed eﬀects, I control for
a fund’s unobserved time-invariant characteristics (e.g. a fund manager talent). In order to
pick up omitted shocks that aﬀect both fund ﬂows and liquidity management of all mutual
23I sort the stocks based on their mean Amihud measure over previous three months into ﬁve portfolios.
I calculate a monthly value-weighted return on each of the portfolios. The return spread LP t is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between return on the least liquid portfolio and the most liquid one.
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funds (e.g. ﬁnancial crises in 2008) I add a full set of unrestricted year ﬁxed eﬀects to
the regression. However, there may still be time-varying, unobservable joint determinants
of active liquidity management and net ﬂows that are not captured by fund ﬁxed eﬀects.
Kacperczyk et al. (2014) argue that manager’s skill is not constant, but varies over time.
A manager’s skill come with the experience. It also depends on the focus of diﬀerent
tasks performed in diﬀerent times. Therefore, the correlation between fund’s ﬂows and
active liquidity management may wrongly indicate the causal relationship, while it is the
unobservable time-varying managerial skill that determines for both fund ﬂows and their
liquidity preferences.
An unobservable time-varying fund’s strategy can also be a potential source of endo-
geneity bias in equation 1.10.24 Diﬀerent economic conditions require diﬀerent strategies of
a portfolio allocation. Suppose, that a change in the strategy (towards more stock-picking
one) takes place in bear times and a fund manager decreases the liquidity of the portfo-
lio. Then, investors might demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the negative change in the
strategy and withdraw their money from the fund. Thus a negative eﬀect of fund ﬂows on
the liquidity preferences would be erroneously identiﬁed.
In the ﬁnal step, I identify a response of the market liquidity premium to a shift in
mutual fund liquidity preferences. Since prices and quantities are endogenously determined
by demand and supply factors, the error term υt in equation 1.11 may be correlated with
the measure of funds’ aggregate liquidity preferences. Thus, I have to separate exogenous
demand shifters in active liquidity management measure from supply ones. By isolating
exogenous variation in mutual fund liquidity preferences, I can identify the impact of mutual
fund demand on the market price of liquidity.
In order to address the simultaneity bias and omitted variable problem, I apply an
instrumental variable approach. The choice of market uncertainty as the instrument comes
naturally from the framework of Vayanos (2004) model, where he uses market volatility as
a main driver of fund’s performance, ﬂows, and liquidity preferences. I exploit the fact that
the realized market volatility is random from the perspective of a single mutual fund, and
thus uncorrelated with the residuals in equations 1.8 and 1.10. While controlling for other
variables such as market-wide liquidity measure ΔNoiset and funding liquidity TEDSpread t,
which reﬂect supply-side of liquidity, I use market uncertainty as an instrument for funds’
aggregate active liquidity management to identify the eﬀect of mutual fund liquidity demand
on the market price of equity in equation 1.11.
I estimate this system of three equations and most of subsequent speciﬁcations using
24Lynch and Musto (2003) propose a model, where they show that investor ﬂows respond to a new fund
strategy.
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panel regression model, calculating standard errors by clustering at the fund and year-
month dimensions. This approach addresses the concern that the errors, conditional on
independent variables, might be correlated within fund and time. Clustering only at the
fund level imposes a very strong assumption that there is no cross-sectional correlation.
Thus, ignoring the time eﬀect in my panel data is incorrect and bias downwards standard
errors, producing too small conﬁdence intervals and too large t-statistics.25
1.4.3 Empirical Results
I start my empirical analysis with examining the relationship between fund ﬂows and per-
formance. I estimate equation 1.8 and report the results in Table 3, columns 4 to 6. In each
of the speciﬁcations, I include fund, quarter of year and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 4 reports
results of equation 1.8 in a bivariate speciﬁcation with ﬁxed eﬀects. The performance co-
eﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. In column 5, I estimate the same equation
and include return on the market portfolio RM,t, Hu et al. (2013) measure of market-wide
liquidity ΔNoiset and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure of aggregated equity market
liquidity PS t. The coeﬃcient on fund performance remains positive and signiﬁcant. Finally
in column 6, I add three more control variables: a measure of funding liquidity TEDSpread t,
quality of fund’s holdings Qualityf,t and a dummy variable Recession equal to one for those
months that belong to NBER recession periods, otherwise zero.
The estimates of fund performance might be biased because of the reverse causality prob-
lem discussed in the previous subsection. Thus, I use the instrumental variable approach,
which require a crucial assumption that the instrument is uncorrelated with the omitted
variables. If this is the case, then the instrument can be used to isolate the variation in the
variable of interest that is uncorrelated with the error term. I use market realized volatility
as the instrument. It seems plausible, that the variation in the market volatility is non-
manipulative from the perspective of a single fund. Table 3 columns 1 through 3 show the
coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst stage regressions in equation 1.9. The coeﬃcient on market un-
certainty remains negative and highly statistically signiﬁcant in all three speciﬁcation. This
means that fund relative performance decreases with market uncertainty. This result is sup-
ported by the existing literature documenting a negative relationship between stock returns
and market volatility (see e.g.: French et al. (1987) and Campbell and Hentschel (1992)).
The magnitude of the estimated eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant. The estimated coeﬃ-
cient from column 1 implies that one standard deviation increase in stock market volatility
decreases fund relative performance by 0.3% (0.21 · 1.386). The size of the coeﬃcient is
25See Petersen (2009).
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unaﬀected by the inclusion of other control variables.
In table 3 columns 7 to 9, I substitute the endogenous variable (performance) with the
exogenous one (realized market volatility) and perform ordinary least square regressions,
where the regression coeﬃcients are both consistent and unbiased. The reduced form re-
gressions show a strong negative and signiﬁcant correlation between fund ﬂows and market
uncertainty, while I control for other market-wide and fund-speciﬁc variables. The estimates
from 2SLS second stage can be understood as re-scaled coeﬃcient from the reduced form.
Thus, I expect a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of fund performance in the ﬂow regres-
sion.26 As predicted, IV speciﬁcation reports positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
on Perf f,t in table 3 columns 10 to 12. It seems that OLS underestimates the size of the co-
eﬃcient. In the IV speciﬁcation, a one standard deviation decrease in performance reduces
the percentage net ﬂows by 0.2%. This applies that fund’s average ﬂow falls by $2,259,180
from $8,515,500 to $6,256,320.27
According to Vayanos (2004) when markets are uncertain, it is more likely that a fund
performance falls below a benchmark. However OLS regressions show only the average eﬀect
of market volatility on fund performance. In order to investigate the impact of market uncer-
tainty on the distribution of fund performance, I use a quantile regression approach, which
estimate the eﬀect of market uncertainty at diﬀerent points of fund performance conditional
distribution. Figure 1.3 shows quintile regression estimated coeﬃcients of realized market
volatility from the model in equation 1.9 for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile.
The regression coeﬃcient at a given quantile indicates the eﬀect of a one standard deviation
increase in market uncertainty on fund performance, assuming that the other variables are
ﬁxed, with 95% conﬁdence interval bands. The ﬁgure shows that a fund’s performance re-
sponse to market uncertainty is heterogeneous. The dispersion of fund performance increases
with market volatility. Speciﬁcally, the upper quartile performance remains unaﬀected by
high market volatility, whereas bad performance deteriorates even further.
The estimates of the second step from equation 1.10 are reported in table 4. The ﬁrst
three columns present OLS regression estimates of fund active liquidity management on its
net ﬂows. The Flowf,t coeﬃcient is negative and insigniﬁcant in each speciﬁcation, meaning
that mutual fund liquidity preferences are unresponsive to redemption obligations. However,
the γ1 coeﬃcient from equation 1.10 might be biased because of omitted variable problem
(e.g. unobservable time-varying manager’s skill) discussed in section 1.4.2. Thus, I use
26The coeﬃcient on performance in 2SLS second stage is equal to the ratio of realized volatility coeﬃcient
in the ﬁrst stage to realized volatility coeﬃcient in the reduced form regression.
27The fund average TNA (unreported) is 1,050 millions. The average monthly ﬂow is: 0.811% ·
$1, 050 Mio. = 8.5155 Mio. One standard deviation increase in realized volatility reduces the percent-
age net ﬂows approximately by 0.2% = 0.811%− 0.22 · 0.987%. This means that the fund’s average netﬂow
is reduces by $2,259,180 to $6,256,320.
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instrumental variable approach and instrument endogenous fund ﬂows with market realized
volatility. Columns 4 to 6 show the reduced form regressions. The coeﬃcient on market
uncertainty is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, I expect coeﬃcient on instru-
mented ﬂows in the active liquidity management regression to be positive and signiﬁcant.28
When I isolate the part of the variation in fund ﬂows that is induced by market uncer-
tainty (by instrumenting fund’s ﬂows with market realized volatility), the Flow f,t coeﬃcient
changes its sign to a positive one (compared with a negative sign in OLS regressions) and
remains strongly signiﬁcant - columns 7 to 9. This implies, that market uncertainty induced
outﬂows are associated with funds actively increasing liquidity of their portfolio. The eﬀect
is substantial: a one standard deviation decrease in fund ﬂows is related to a 1.9 standard
deviation increase in a fund’s ﬂight-to-liquidity.
To examine the impact of funds’ active liquidity management on market liquidity pre-
mium, I re-estimate equations 1.8 to 1.10 in case of one large equity fund consisting of all the
funds in my sample. I compute funds’ aggregate performance, ﬂows, and active liquidity
management measure by calculating monthly averages weighted by market capitalization
of funds’ holdings. I expect that in times of market uncertainty funds’ aggregate liquidity
preferences create a price pressure in the equity market. Speciﬁcally, while the redemption
obligations increase with market uncertainty, mutual funds prepare themselves for possi-
ble withdrawals by increasing liquidity of their portfolio. They demand more liquid stocks
pushing their prices up. On the other hand, illiquid stocks become less attractive because
they entail high costs when they have to be liquidated (e.g. in order to meet redemptions).
The prices of illiquid stocks are expected to decrease because mutual funds require higher
return as a compensation for greater liquidation risk. Consequently, the realized return on a
zero-cost portfolio (long in the quintile with the most illiquid stocks and short in the quintile
with most liquid one) declines as well. Table 5 reports the aggregate time series regression
estimates from equations 1.8 – 1.11. Columns 1 and 2 show reduced form regressions of
aggregate fund performance and ﬂows on the realized market volatility. Similar to the esti-
mates from panel regressions, the aggregate regressions report a negative impact of market
uncertainty on fund performance and net ﬂows. OLS regression estimates of equation 1.11
are reported in columns 6 through 9 in Table 5. The estimated OLS coeﬃcients show a
positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of funds’ aggregate liquidity preferences on the
measured return spread between illiquid and liquid portfolio. This means that an increase
in mutual fund aggregate demand for liquid stocks create a downward price pressure on
illiquid stocks, and thus the return spread decreases as well.
However, the δ1 from equation 1.11 might be biased because of the simultaneity prob-
28The 2SLS ﬁrst stage of fund behaviour regression is in table 3 in columns 7–9.
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lem rooted in the analysis of the prices on quantities that I described in subsection 1.4.2.
Therefore, I use instrumental variable approach to mitigate the endogeneity issue. Columns
3 to 5 report coeﬃcient estimates from the 2SLS ﬁrst stage regression, where I regress the
aggregate funds’ active liquidity management measure (which increases with illiquidity) on
the realized market volatility. Analogous to the panel regressions (in table 4), the aggregate
time-series regressions show a negative relationship between market uncertainty and a mea-
sure of fund liquidity preferences. An increase in market volatility results in mutual funds
tilting their portfolio towards more liquid assets. Columns 9 to 11 report the reduced form
regressions, where I substitute the endogenous active liquidity management with exogenous
realized market volatility. When the market volatility increases, the return spread between
illiquid and liquid portfolios narrow. The market uncertainty coeﬃcient from the reduced
form regression is negative and highly signiﬁcant, implying a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of fund behaviour on the return diﬀerential.
In the last three columns of table 5, I report the coeﬃcient estimates from instrumental
variable approach. I use the exogenous variation of realized market volatility as the instru-
ment for funds’ aggregate liquidity preferences and regress the return on a zero-cost portfolio
on the instrumented liquidity management and other control variables that are supposed
to capture the eﬀect of liquidity supply (e.g. market-wide liquidity measure Noiset and
funding liquidity measure TEDSpread t). In all speciﬁcations the Bt coeﬃcient is positive
and signiﬁcant, providing similar results to the OLS regressions. However, OLS seems to
underestimate the impact of funds’ active liquidity management. A one standard devia-
tion increase in aggregate fund liquidity preferences (one standard deviation decrease in the
measure), decreases the return spread by 2.13% from 0.012% to -2.118% (0.63 · 3.381%).29
1.4.4 Heterogeneity
Up to this point I only use market volatility over-time variation that is common to all
funds. However, a fund’s exposure to market uncertainty depends on the exposure of its
holdings. Because of diﬀerences across funds’ holdings compositions, mutual funds’ exposure
to market uncertainty diﬀer as well. In order to capture the diversity of funds’ responses to
market uncertainty arising from the exposure of the individual holdings, I construct a fund
speciﬁc realized volatility measure. I use daily (high, low, open, close) prices for ten S&P
500 Sector Indices that I obtained from Bloomberg, and compute the realized volatilities for
each sector following Garman and Klass (1980). Then I match fund holdings to the ten GICS
290.011%, 3.381% are the unreported mean and standard deviation of value-weighted liquidity premium.
29
sectors.30 I calculate a fund speciﬁc realized volatility by taking a weighted average of sector
realized volatilities with weights equal to the percentage of the portfolio invested in each
of the sectors. I expect that mutual funds respond stronger to their fund speciﬁc realized
volatilities, which reﬂect more precisely the exposure of the holdings to market uncertainty.
I call my analysis of assessing the heterogeneity in a fund’s active liquidity management to
market uncertainty, measured with a fund speciﬁc realized volatility, a ‘direct approach.’
Table 6 reports the results of the direct approach. In the ﬁrst column I regress funds’
liquidity preferences on overall market realized volatility (as in the previous analysis), thus it
serves as a reference point.31 In the second column, I estimate the impact of a fund-speciﬁc
realized volatility on the active liquidity management of a fund. The size of the coeﬃcient
on the fund-speciﬁc realized volatility is indeed larger (by around 16%) than the coeﬃ-
cient on market-wide realized volatility.32 However, fund-speciﬁc realized volatility relies on
fund-speciﬁc sector weights, that are simultaneously determined with the active liquidity
management decision Bt,f . In order to mitigate the endogeneity problem, I construct an
exogenous fund-speciﬁc realized volatility measure RVolEXf,t that uses sector weights diﬀerent
from actual ones. In column 3, I use weights that correspond to the average of fund-speciﬁc
sector weights over previous three months. In column 4, instead of value-weighting I use
equal weights for sector realized volatilities. 2SLS second stage regressions are presented
in columns 5 to 6. The size of the instrumented coeﬃcient on the fund-speciﬁc realized
volatility (0.074) remains larger than overall market realized volatility coeﬃcient (0.061)
in column 1. This implies that market-wide realized volatility captures funds’ exposure to
uncertainty in a noisy manner and funds’ responses depend on uncertainty that is embedded
in their holdings. Once the exposure of the holdings to market uncertainty is more precisely
identiﬁed, a fund’s response becomes stronger.
Existing literature (e.g. Chordia (1996)) suggests that in equilibrium investors with
high liquidation risk choose to invest in those mutual funds that charge lower load fees and
hold more liquid assets. This implies that mutual funds diﬀer from each other in terms of
their initial liquidity positions. Redemptions are costly for a mutual fund for two reasons:
unnecessary trading expenses, and cash holdings compromising fund performance. When
market uncertainty increases, illiquid mutual funds face potentially higher costs of meeting
withdrawals, and thus they are expected to respond stronger to the increases in market
volatility.33 In order to examine the relationship between a fund’s initial liquidity position
30S&P 500 sector and industry indices use Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standards (GICS) as well.
31The time period of the analysis is limited to 144 months from January 2002 to December 2013, because
of the sector indices data availability.
32( 0.0710.061 − 1) · 100% = 16.4%
33See also Manconi et al. (2012), who show that among funds holding ‘toxic’ securitized bonds, those with
high turnover and high volatility of their ﬂows react stronger to liquidity dry-ups by liquidating more of
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and its response to market uncertainty, I develop a measure of an ‘illiquidity shock’ for
each fund. This measure is supposed to capture shocks to a portfolio’s liquidity that are
independent of a manager’s decision. More precisely, I use the component of the change
in a portfolio’s liquidity stemming from the shift due to a change in the market-wide liq-
uidity of the holdings (their Amihud measure). A fund-speciﬁc liquidity shock is deﬁned
as a percentage change in the liquidity of a portfolio keeping a fund’s investment decision
constant:34
IlliqShock f,t =
∑Sf,t−1
s=1 ω
s
f,t−1(Illiqs,t − Illiqs,t−1)∑Sf,t−1
s=1 ω
s
f,t−1Illiqs,t
,
where ωsf,t−1 and Illiqs,t are deﬁned in section 1.3.2. In my analysis, to which I refer as
the ‘indirect approach’, the main variable of interest is the interaction term between a
fund-speciﬁc illiquidity shock and market realized volatility. I expect funds experiencing
an exogenous shock to the liquidity of their portfolio (they become more illiquid) respond
stronger to uncertainty in the market, and thus tilt their portfolio towards liquid assets more
aggressively.
Table 6 columns 7 and 8 show estimated coeﬃcients from the regression of a mutual fund
active liquidity management measure on market realized volatility, a fund-speciﬁc liquidity
shock and other control variables. The IlliqShock f,t coeﬃcient in column 7 is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant, as is the eﬀect of market uncertainty. This may imply that mutual
funds target the liquidity of their portfolios. When they experience exogenous illiquidity
shock, they actively trade stocks in order to mitigate the eﬀect of the shock. This result
supports the theoretical model of Ang et al. (2014), who predict that investors have an
optimal composition of liquid and illiquid assets, and whenever it is possible they rebalance
their portfolios to the optimal ratio. Column 8 shows the interaction term between a fund-
speciﬁc illiquidity shock and market realized volatility. The interaction coeﬃcient is negative
and signiﬁcant, meaning that those mutual funds that are subject to the illiquidity shock
in times of high market uncertainty more aggressively change their portfolio towards more
liquid stocks. The main eﬀects of realized market volatility and illiquidity shock remain
negative, yet insigniﬁcant.
1.5 Robustness Test
To check the robustness of my ﬁndings, I re-estimate equation 1.10, but use alternative
measures of stock liquidity - the bid-ask spread and a log transformation of Amihud measure.
corporate bonds to meet redemptions.
34The illiquidity shock is obtained from the shift-share analysis of a change in a portfolio’s liquidity in
equation 1.4.
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I also incorporate the cash holdings, which constitute a considerable part (on average 3.2%)
of a portfolio, to the active liquidity management measure. Finally, I use only the non-
forcastable component of market volatility and I re-estimate the set of equation 1.8 – 1.11.
1.5.1 Cash Holdings
Stock holdings constitute only one part of mutual fund’s portfolio. A skilful cash manage-
ment can contribute to a fund’s ﬂexibility. Managers with available cash can react quickly
to new information by purchasing an attractive stock or avoid costly ﬁre sales by meeting
redemptions with their cash buﬀer.35 Cash is inﬁnitely liquid, therefore it is important to
include it into my analysis. When a mutual fund faces a threat of withdrawal, it can enhance
the liquidity of the portfolio either by increasing cash holdings or by increasing a fraction of
liquid equities. Consequently, cash and equity decisions are interrelated and treating them
separately can provide an erroneous result. In order to capture the interaction between cash
and equity decisions, I include cash in my active liquidity management measure. The square-
root transformation of Amihud measure allows me to incorporate cash holdings without any
diﬃculties. Thus, I assign the lowest value (zero) of Amihud measure to cash. In columns 1
to 2, 5 to 6, and 9 to 10 in table 7, I use the active liquidity management measure computed
with the square-root transformation of Amihud measure incorporating cash and repeat the
same analysis from table 4. The results are similar: volatility-induced outﬂows are strongly
associated with managers increasing liquidity of their portfolio. Columns 1 and 2 report
OLS regression estimates, and columns 9 and 10 show IV coeﬃcients from the regressions
of the active liquidity management with cash on fund’s net ﬂows. In case of OLS regression
the coeﬃcient on Flow f,t is negative and signiﬁcant. However, when I isolate the variation
in fund ﬂows that stems from market uncertainty, the fund ﬂow coeﬃcient changes its sign
and remains highly signiﬁcant. By incorporating cash into funds’ liquidity preferences, the
eﬀect of volatility-induced net ﬂows on the active liquidity management measure remain
almost unaltered.
Some of the existing studies (Chordia (1996) and Huang (2014)) treat cash decision
separately. Consequently, I replace the active liquidity management measure Bf,t in equation
1.10 with the percentage of holdings held in the form of cash and report the estimates in
table 7.36 Flowf,t coeﬃcient estimates from OLS cash holdings regressions in columns 3
and 4 is positive and signiﬁcant. This suggests that cash holdings decrease with funds’
outﬂows. The reduced form regressions in columns 7 to 8 report a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect of realized market volatility on the level of cash holdings. Columns 11 and 12 show
35See e.g. Edelen (1999), Coval and Staﬀord (2007), Simutin (2013).
36The ﬁrst stage regressions have been already reported in table 3 columns 4 through 6.
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the IV results. The coeﬃcient on Flow f,t changes it sign to a negative one and remains
signiﬁcant (as it does in active liquidity management regression in table 4), when I only
use the variation in funds’ ﬂows that is induced by market volatility. This means that fund
managers increase the level of percentage cash holdings when they face uncertainty induced
withdrawals. A one standard deviation decrease in fund ﬂows increases on average cash
holdings by 0.8% from 3.2% to 4.00% (0.92 · 0.959%).37
1.5.2 Alternative Liquidity Measures
Throughout my analysis, I use the square-root transformation of Amihud measure because it
enables me to incorporate cash holdings into a fund’s active liquidity management measure.
However, some of the existing studies on stock liquidity choose a log transformation of
Amihud measure to reduce the inﬂuence of the extreme outliers.38 I also use the bid-ask
spread as a measure of stock liquidity by averaging the daily proportional bid-ask spread
over a month.39 The results with alternative liquidity measures are reported in table 8.
Both the reduced form and 2SLS second stage regression estimates conﬁrm the previous
results. Volatility induced outﬂows are strongly associated with fund managers actively
shifting their portfolio towards more liquid assets. This result is robust irrespective of the
stock liquidity measure I use.
1.5.3 Market Volatility Shock
I re-estimate the set of equations 1.8 to 1.11 using an alternative measure of market uncer-
tainty. I use the volatility shock, that is a non-forecastable component of realized market
volatility. I regress current Garman and Klass (1980) realized market volatility on this
month forecast VIX, and use the residual from this regression as the measure of the shock
part of market volatility - Res(Vol)t. I report the estimates from reduced form and second
stage panel regressions of funds’ performance, ﬂows, active liquidity management and time-
series regressions of the measured return spread in table 9. Each row of the table reports the
estimated coeﬃcient and t-statistics for the variable of interest and other control variables.
In each of the eight reduced form regressions, the estimated coeﬃcient of volatility shock
has the same sign, is similar in the size to the coeﬃcient on realized volatility in tables
3 to 5, and remains highly statistically signiﬁcant. These results show that the previous
37My empirical results are supported by Chordia (1996), who shows that equity mutual funds increase
their cash holdings when facing more redemption uncertainty.
38See e.g.: Brennan et al. (2013), Hameed et al. (2010), and Karolyi et al. (2012)
39I compute the weighted average for each portfolio as in equation 1.3, and then decompose the change
in the holdings - equation 1.4.
33
results are not just an artefact of market volatility predictability, but rather that a fund’s
performance, ﬂows and liquidity preferences respond to the non-forcastable component of
market volatility, which results in the time-varying market price of liquidity.
By using the variation in funds’ aggregate active liquidity management induced by mar-
ket volatility shock, I show that mutual funds’ liquidity preferences have a signiﬁcant impact
on the market liquidity premium. As a proxy for the market price of liquidity, I choose the
return on the zero-cost portfolio that is long in the quintile of the most illiquid stocks and
short in the quintile with the most liquid ones. The reduced form regressions in columns
11 and 12 report a negative relationship between unanticipated market volatility and the
return spread. The coeﬃcients on the instrumented funds’ aggregate liquidity preferences
in columns 13 and 14 are positive, signiﬁcant and of the comparable size to the coeﬃcient in
table 5 column 14. A one standard deviation decrease in the behaviour measure (increase in
the liquidity of the aggregate portfolio) decreases the return spread by 2.06% from 0.012%
to -2.048%.
1.6 Conclusion
I contribute to the empirical asset pricing literature by providing a potential explanation for
the relationship between the market price of liquidity and the uncertainty. While existing
research investigates the impact of market uncertainty on mutual fund capital ﬂows, a direct
link between uncertainty-induced fund behaviour and the market price of liquidity have not
been examined. This paper bridges this gap by showing one channel through which market
uncertainty impacts the liquidity premium.
This empirical study builds on Vayanos (2004)’s theoretical framework, where investors
withdraw their money when a fund’s performance falls below a given threshold, which is
more likely during times of high market uncertainty. Consequently, managers facing a
threat of increasing redemption obligations tilt their portfolio toward more liquid stocks
to minimize future transaction costs. This aggregate shift in a fund’s liquidity preference
translates into a market level increase in the price of liquidity. To examine the described
mechanism, I measure a fund’s active liquidity management using data from Morningstar on
monthly holdings of US active mutual funds investing in US equity between January 1998
and December 2013. I obtain the measure by isolating the change in a portfolio’s liquidity
that is due to a manager’s decision over a holding’s composition.
Using this measure of active liquidity management, I study the response of a fund to
uncertainty-induced net ﬂows. OLS estimates suggests that funds do not respond to their
ﬂows. However, OLS estimates are potentially biased by unobservable time-variation in the
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data that is correlated with fund ﬂows. To address this endogeneity concern I use market
volatility as an instrument to identify the causal eﬀect of uncertainty on the liquidity of
a mutual fund - a procedure that arises naturally from the structure of Vayanos’s (2004)
model.
I provide empirical evidence of a negative relationship between fund net ﬂows and market
uncertainty, which is consistent with existing research (Ederington and Golubeva (2011)
and Ferson and Kim (2012)). By isolating the variation in fund ﬂows induced by market
volatility, I show that mutual funds actively manage the liquidity of their portfolios in
response to their redemption obligations. A one standard deviation decrease in fund’s net
ﬂows causes a 1.9 standard deviation increase in an actively managed portfolio’s liquidity. I
also ﬁnd consistent results when I include cash holdings into the active liquidity management
measure or examine fund cash management separately. Mutual fund managers increase
the liquidity of their portfolio by tilting their positions towards more liquid stocks and
expanding their cash holdings. However, these results do not provide any insight on the
heterogeneity of a fund’s response to the redemption obligation, because I use over-time
variation that is common to all funds. I address this issue by constructing a fund-level
uncertainty measure, and I show that a fund’s exposure to the volatility depends on the
exposure of their holdings. I also ﬁnd that mutual funds experiencing an adverse shock to
the liquidity of their holdings tilt their portfolio towards more liquid stocks and rebalance
their positions even more aggressively when market volatility is high.
These results indicate that mutual funds have time-varying liquidity preferences. Ap-
plying Vayanos’s theoretical framework to my empirical analysis, I show that a volatility-
induced aggregate increase in a fund’s actively managed portfolio’s liquidity will exert a
downward price pressure on illiquid stocks. A return on a zero-cost portfolio, which is long
in illiquid and short in liquid stocks, decreases in response to mutual funds’ aggregate shift
towards liquid assets. The eﬀect is substantial: a one standard deviation increase in a fund’s
liquidity preference, decreases the measured return spread by 2.13 percent.
This paper provides a rational explanation of asset mispricing. Based on my analysis,
I show that many mutual funds follow the same strategy by actively increasing liquidity of
their portfolios when they expect their redemption obligations to increase. Whereas trans-
actions of a single fund have no signiﬁcant market impact, an aggregate shift in funds’
liquidity preferences could potentially deviate prices from their fundamental values. I show
that when market uncertainty increases, many mutual funds contemporaneously face pos-
sible withdrawals and thus tilt their portfolio towards more liquid assets at the same time.
Consequently, the market-wide price of liquidity increases and illiquid stocks are adversely
aﬀected by this non-fundamental shift in funds’ demand.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Vayanos (2004) model
The model’s set up is in continuous-time, inﬁnite horizon economy. The market consists of
N risky assets with dividends being driven by stochastic volatility vt. The volatility follows
a square root process:
dvt = γ(v¯ − vt)dt+ σ√vtdBvt . (1.12)
The dividend process δnt for a single asset n is deﬁned as:
dδnt = κ(δ¯ − δnt) +√vt(φndBt + ψnσdBvt + dBnt), (1.13)
where dBvt , dBt, dBnt is a systematic, residual, and idiosyncratic volatility shock.
There is Sn shares supplied to the market of asset n, The asset n can be bought (sold) at
pnt + n (pnt − n), where n is a stock-speciﬁc exogenous transactions cost and pnt denotes
an average price.
The model focuses on mutual fund, whose redemption obligations depend on fund’s
performance. A fund manager manages a fund of a size Wt and he has full discretion
regarding portfolio’s asset allocation. A manager has CARA type preferences:
−E
∫ ∞
0
exp(−αct − βt)dt, (1.14)
where ct is a consumption rate.
Withdrawals are extreme. Once individual decide to redeem the money, a fund’s size
is reduced to zero. Mutual fund investors withdraw their money from random reason, but
also if fund’s performance falls below a threshold - Lˆ. Investors’ monitoring takes place at
discrete times kΔt with a probability μˆ, where k ∈ Z and Δt > 0. Investors’ monitoring
implies evaluation of the change in a fund’s size during the interval [t−Δt, t]. Consequently,
a fund is liquidated with a probability:
μˆProb
(
Wt −Wt−δt) ≤ −Lˆ
)
. (1.15)
By assuming that Δt is very small, μˆ = μΔT and Lˆ = L
√
Δt. Consequently, a fund’s
liquidation takes place at a rate μπt, where πt is:
πt = lim
Δt→0
Prob
(
Wt −Wt−δt) ≤ −L
√
Δt
)
. (1.16)
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So far this liquidation rate captures only liquidations due to poor fund’s performance, there-
fore an arbitrary small constant λ is added to reﬂect a rate at which a fund may be liquidated
for random reasons.
A manager faces two budget constraints in his optimization problem:
1. Evolution of a fund’s size:
dWt = f
(
Wt −
N∑
n=1
xntpnt
)
dt+
N∑
n=1
xnt(δntdt+dpnt)− rWtdt−
N∑
n=1
n
∣∣∣∣dxntdt
∣∣∣∣ , (1.17)
where xnt is number of shares invested in stock n. The evolution of the fund size
depends on liquidation event as well. After a liquidation occurrence fund size decreases
by:
ΔWt = −
N∑
n=1
n
(|x−nt|+ |x+nt|) , (1.18)
where x+nt and x
−
nt denote the number of shares invested in asset n in a new and old
fund, respectively.
2. Evolution of a fund manager’s wealth:
dwt = (rwt + aWt − ct)dt, (1.19)
where aWt is a manager’s fee charged for providing services to his investors.
The paper analysis two scenarios:
  non-performance based liquidation40,
  performance based liquidation,
that provide distinctive solutions. By maximizing manager’s utility function with respect to
budget constraints in case of non-performance based liquidation, the models implies that:
  volatility and liquidity premium do not aﬀect the liquidation rate (proposition 1),
  there is no eﬀect of transaction costs on an asset price and its risk premium (proposition
1).
In case of performance-based liquidation, the liquidation rate is λ+μπt with μ > 0. There is
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between ﬁrst order conditions in no performance- versus performance-
40The monitoring rate μ is assigned a value of zero.
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based scenario41:
Et(dRnt) = ACovt(dRnt, dRMt) + AZ
′(vt)Covt(dRnt, dvt)
+μπxn(vt, xt)|xt=S
exp(2A − 1)
A
dt
+ [r + 2 [λ+ μπ(vt)] exp(2A)] ndt. (1.20)
First, liquidity premium depends not only on λ (as it is the case in no performance-based
scenario), but also on the performance monitoring rate μ and the probability rate that a
fund performance falls below a given threshold πt. It is more likely that a fund underper-
formances, when volatility is high. Consequently, market risk premium per unit of volatility
increase with volatility42. The second term is new and represents (liquidation) risk premium.
Increasing a fraction of a portfolio invested in asset n aﬀects the riskiness of a portfolio and
consequently the probability of a fund’s performance falling below a given benchmark. This
is why, fund’s managers asset allocation decision become more risk-averse when volatility
increases and a liquidations becomes more likely.
The solution of the performance-based scenario (proposition 5) provides diﬀerent predic-
tions than no performance-based case. First, there is a direct eﬀect of volatility on asset’s
risk premium, because of liquidation risk premium’s sensitivity to the volatility. Second,
illiquid assets are subject to greater price discount in face of volatility increase. As a conse-
quence of fund’s underperformance in face of market volatility, a liquidation is more likely,
and thus a fund manager prefers more liquid assets (i.e. low transaction costs).
41Terms that are only relevant for the performance based scenario are in bold.
42Vayanos (2004) discusses this implication in footnote 35.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Fund Aggregate Performance and Realized Market Volatility.
This ﬁgure shows time series of Garman and Klass (1980) monthly realized market volatility (black) and
aggregate performance of US active equity mutual funds investing in US equity (grey) from January 1998
to December 2013. Both fund performance and market volatility are z-scored. The shaded gray areas
depict periods of the highest market volatility.
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Figure 1.2: Fund Aggregate Flows and Realized Market Volatility.
This ﬁgure shows time series of Garman and Klass (1980) monthly realized market volatility (black) and
aggregate net ﬂows of US active equity mutual funds investing in US equity (grey) from January 1998 to
December 2013. Both fund net ﬂows and market volatility are z-scored. The shaded gray areas depict
periods of the highest market volatility.
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Figure 1.3: Quintile Regression of Fund Performance on Market Realized Volatility.
This ﬁgure graphically depicts realized volatility estimated coeﬃcients from quintile regressions (for
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles) of fund performance on market volatility, ﬁxed eﬀects and
other control variables. The respective values are connected by the maroon solid line with accompanying
estimated 95% conﬁdence intervals shaded in grey.
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Table 1.1: Mutual Fund Summary Statistics.
This table shows summary statistics on the mutual fund sample obtained from the Morningstar
database. The sample includes US active equity mutual funds investing in US equity that existed at any
time during January 1998 through December 2013 for which monthly holdings information is available,
overall 85,560 fund-month observations. No. Funds is the number of distinct funds each year in my sample.
TNA is a total net assets. No. Stocks per Fund is a number of stocks held by a fund on average; No.
Stocks is an average number of distinct stocks held by all mutual funds in the sample; Matching Rate is the
percentage of the holdings value that has been successfully merged with CRSP stock data (mutual funds
with matching rate lower than 70% are discarded from the sample).
Year
No.
TNA ($ Million)
No. Stocks No. Matching
Funds per Fund Stocks Rate
Mean Median Mean Median
1998 169 1881.32 765.16 103 64 2285 0.81
1999 234 1203.71 551.64 96 62 2365 0.82
2000 296 1217.10 658.12 121 71 3193 0.83
2001 374 1053.51 364.40 101 68 2469 0.86
2002 525 1016.71 375.54 121 76 3053 0.89
2003 689 878.33 252.05 121 77 3162 0.89
2004 685 883.19 274.16 123 82 3203 0.87
2005 584 1080.80 380.15 131 82 3252 0.88
2006 535 961.79 316.34 124 82 3534 0.90
2007 636 1430.40 665.75 162 85 3908 0.91
2008 677 1406.80 541.72 184 89 3816 0.90
2009 787 1191.11 457.29 195 95 3620 0.90
2010 868 1475.04 560.56 201 93 3652 0.90
2011 995 1743.75 579.85 189 90 3509 0.89
2012 1004 1962.01 616.62 186 85 3417 0.89
2013 1006 3468.98 743.83 191 88 3391 0.89
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Table 4: First Stage, OLS and Instrumental Variable Panel Regressions of Fund’s Behaviour on Fund’s
Flows and Other Control Variables.
This table uses monthly data from Morningstar from January 1998 through December 2013 (85,560
fund-month observations) to examine the relationship between fund’s behaviour and its net ﬂows. All
the variables (excluding Recession) are z-scored. Columns 1–3 show the coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst stage
regression of fund ﬂows Flowf,t on realized market volatility. Columns 4–6 show the coeﬃcients from
OLS regression of fund active liquidity management Bf,t on fund’s net ﬂows Flowf,t. Columns 7–9 show
instrumental variable regression coeﬃcients. I use Garman and Klass (1980) realized market volatility
RVol t as the instrument for the fund net ﬂows in the columns 7–9. I include control variables as: return on
S&P500 index RM,t, Hu et al. (2013) measure of the market-wide liquidity ΔNoiset, Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003) measure of equity market liquidity PSLiqt, a measure of funding liquidity TEDSpread t, fund’s
value-weighted quality measure of its holdings Qualityf,t, and a dummy variable Recession is a dummy
variable equal one if there was a NBER recession in a given month, otherwise zero. I control for fund, year
and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. The t-statistics reported in the tables reﬂect robust standard errors that are
clustered both at year-month and a fund level.
OLS Reduced Form IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Flowf,t
-0.0031 -0.0037 -0.0036 1.30 1.92 2.24
(-1.18) (-1.41) (-1.31) (3.73) (3.00) (2.94)
RV olt
-0.057 -0.058 -0.062
(-4.60) (-3.66) (-3.70)
RM,t
0.019 0.017 -0.00027 0.000098 -0.039 -0.049
(1.73) (1.68) (-0.03) (0.01) (-1.56) (-1.64)
ΔNoiset
-0.014 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.026 -0.034
(-1.15) (-0.75) (-0.92) (-0.79) (-2.06) (-2.05)
PSLiqt
0.0040 0.0014 -0.0095 -0.0098 -0.031 -0.038
(0.31) (0.10) (-0.81) (-0.79) (-1.71) (-1.81)
TEDSpreadt
-0.016 0.0065 0.010
(-0.87) (0.61) (0.49)
Qualityf,t
0.0051 0.0048 0.029
(0.75) (0.72) (1.18)
Recession
-14.5 22.1 -6.45
(-0.44) (0.64) (-0.09)
Qtr, Year, Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 85560 85560 74609 85560 85560 74609 85560 85560 74609
R2 0.0016 0.0022 0.0023 0.0034 0.0036 0.0037
t statistics in parentheses
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Table 6: First Stage, Reduced Form, and Instrumental Variable Panel Regressions of Fund’s Active
Liquidity Management on Fund Speciﬁc Uncertainty and Illiquidity Shock.
This table uses monthly data from Morningstar from January 2002 through December 2013 (79,424
fund-month observations) - columns 1 to 6 and from January 1998 through December 2013 (85,560
fund-month observations) - columns 7 and 8, to examine the heterogeneous responses of mutual fund to
market uncertainty. All the variables (excluding Recession) are z-scored. Columns 1 to 6 show the results
of a direct analysis of mutual fund heterogeneous responses to market uncertainty. Columns 7 and 8
report estimates from indirect approach. Columns 1 and 2 show OLS regression of fund active liquidity
management on market-wide and fund-speciﬁc uncertainty measure, respectively. I construct fund-speciﬁc
uncertainty by value weighting S&P500 sector realized volatilities, where weights are equal to fraction of
the portfolio invested in a given sector. In columns 3 and 4, I regress fund active liquidity management on
alternative measures of fund-speciﬁc uncertainty, which does not require actual portfolio weights. In column
3, I use weights that correspond to the average of fund-speciﬁc sector weights over previous three months.
In column 4, I calculate a simple average of the sector-speciﬁc realized volatilities. Columns 5–6 report IV
regression estimates of fund active liquidity management on the instrumented fund-speciﬁc uncertainty
measure, where alternative measures from column 3 and 4 are used as instruments. Columns 7–8 show the
coeﬃcients from OLS regression of fund behaviour on market-wide uncertainty and fund-speciﬁc liquidity
shock. The liquidity shock at the fund level is deﬁned in equation 1.12. I use Garman and Klass (1980)
realized volatility estimator as a measure of market and sector uncertainty. I include control variables as:
return on S&P500 index RM,t, Hu et al. (2013) measure of the market-wide liquidity ΔNoiset, Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) measure of equity market liquidity PSLiqt, a measure of funding liquidity TEDSpread t,
and a dummy variable Recession is a dummy variable equal one if there was a NBER recession in a given
month, otherwise zero. I control for fund, year and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. The t-statistics reported in the
tables reﬂect robust standard errors that are clustered both at year-month and a fund level.
D I R E C T I N D I R E C T
RV olt RV olf,t Reduced Form IV Liquidity Shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RV olt
-0.061 -0.045 -0.030
(-3.57) (-2.49) (-1.31)
RV olf,t
-0.071 -0.071 -0.074
(-3.38) (-3.48) (-3.61)
RV olEXf,t
-0.071 -0.072
(-3.47) (-3.59)
IlliqShockf,t
-0.029 -0.015
(-2.84) (-1.44)
IlliqShockf,t ×RV olt
-0.0072
(-2.22)
RM,t
0.0038 0.0049 0.0043 0.0044 0.0049 0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0029
(0.38) (0.49) (0.43) (0.43) (0.48) (0.43) (-0.45) (-0.28)
ΔNoiset
-0.0080 -0.0068 -0.0070 -0.0060 -0.0068 -0.0067 -0.0038 0.0051
(-0.58) (-0.48) (-0.50) (-0.42) (-0.48) (-0.48) (-0.30) (0.37)
PSLiqt
-0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012
(-1.03) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.11) (-1.01) (-0.92)
55
TEDSpreadt
0.0037 0.0021 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0027
(0.35) (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.25) (-0.24) (-0.24)
Recession
46.3 67.6 67.5 67.6 67.8 69.7 3.59 4.07
(1.14) (1.56) (1.57) (1.57) (1.59) (1.63) (0.11) (0.12)
Qtr, Year, Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 79424 79424 79424 79424 79424 79424 85560 85560
R2 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.015
t statistics in parentheses
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Table 8: Reduced Form, and IV Panel Regressions with Alternative Measures of Liquidity.
This table uses monthly data from Morningstar from January 1998 through December 2013 (85,560 fund-
month observations) to examine the relationship between fund’s active asset allocation and its net ﬂows.
ln(Amihud) is a natural logarithm of Amihud measure. Bid-Ask is a proportional Bis-Ask spread. All
the variables (excluding Recession) are z-scored. Columns 1–4 show the reduced form regression coeﬃcient
of alternative behaviour measures on fund’s net ﬂows. Columns 5–8 show the coeﬃcients from the 2SLS
second stage regression of fund’s active liquidity management (computed with alternative liquidity mea-
sures) on fund ﬂows instrumented with realized market volatility RVol t. I use Garman and Klass (1980)
realized market volatility RVol t as the instrument for the performance in the columns (7)-(9). I include
control variables as: return on S&P500 index RM,t, Hu et al. (2013) measure of the market-wide liquidity
ΔNoiset, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure of equity market liquidity PSLiqt, a measure of funding
liquidity TEDSpread t, fund’s value-weighted quality measure of its holdings Qualityf,t, and a dummy vari-
able Recession is a dummy variable equal one if there was a NBER recession in a given month, otherwise
zero. I control for fund, year and quarter ﬁxed eﬀects. The t-statistics reported in the tables reﬂect robust
standard errors that are clustered both at year-month and a fund level.
Reduced Form IV
ln(Amihud) Bid−Ask ln(Amihud) Bid−Ask
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Flowf,t
3.09 4.52 1.45 2.56
(4.05) (2.63) (3.92) (2.64)
RV olt
-16.4 -15.3 -7.74 -8.70
(-5.80) (-4.24) (-3.95) (-2.90)
RM,t
0.018 0.00044 -0.075 -0.053
(0.73) (0.03) (-1.25) (-1.37)
ΔNoiset
0.016 -0.0079 -0.021 -0.029
(0.58) (-0.48) (-0.51) (-1.42)
PSLiqt
-0.0020 -0.0045 -0.064 -0.040
(-0.13) (-0.24) (-1.64) (-1.34)
TEDSpreadt
-0.021 0.036 -0.023 0.035
(-0.94) (1.98) (-0.59) (1.26)
Qualityf,t
-0.046 -0.028 0.012 0.0052
(-2.80) (-1.93) (0.16) (0.11)
Recession
85.6 -93.8 42.4 -118.2
(0.88) (-1.28) (0.28) (-1.58)
Qtr, Year, Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 85560 74609 85560 74609 85560 74609 85560 74609
R2 0.053 0.055 0.033 0.035
t statistics in parentheses
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Essay 2
House Prices and Taxes1
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Abstract
By using the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark as an exogenous shock to mu-
nicipal tax rates, we ﬁnd that a 1%-point increase in income tax rates lead to a drop in
house prices of 7.9% and a 1 -point increase in the property tax rates lead to a 1.1%
drop in house prices. The simple present values of a 1%-point perpetual income tax
increase and a 1 -point property tax increase, relative to the median house price, are
7% and 3.3%, respectively. Our ﬁndings are thus in line with the predicted median
tax loss. This indicates that the housing market eﬃciently incorporates taxes into
house prices. The exogeneity of the shock to taxes and the size of the dataset is an
improvement over earlier studies.
64
2.1 Introduction
It is diﬃcult to measure the eﬀect of taxes on house prices. Since the seminal work of Oates
(1969) many researchers have tried to estimate the degree of property tax capitalization
into house prices. That is, the extent to which higher property taxes, all else equal, lead
to lower house prices. Full capitalization is said to occur when the change in house prices
exactly corresponds to the present value of a change in taxes. The common approach (as
in Palmon and Smith (1998b), Oates (1969), Edel and Sclar (1974), Oates (1973), and
Rosen and Fullerton (1977)) in the literature has been to use cross-sectional data on house
sales in one or a few counties with varying taxes. Besides the small sample size and the
small geographical area, the main problem with this type of analysis is controlling for public
service, which varies signiﬁcantly between counties. This is because it is hard to measure
the quality of public service.
Another approach (as in Wicks et al. (1968) and Smith (1970)) would be to use tax
changes from one year to another, where diﬀerences in the quality of public service are
arguably much smaller than in the cross section. However, this approach introduces a
potential bias if the change in taxes are not completely exogenous to house prices. For
example, if the factors driving the tax changes might also inﬂuence house prices directly,
the estimates will be biased.
In this paper we use the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark as a natural experiment
in which the tax changes are completely exogenous, and thus provide unbiased estimates of
the eﬀects of taxes on house prices.
Much of the previous literature on taxes and house prices estimates the degree of tax
capitalization. Taxes are fully capitalized into house prices if, all else equal, the change
in house prices exactly equals the present value of the change in taxes. That is, when
accounting for all other factors, the change in house prices completely equals:
N∑
n
ΔTax
(1 + i)n
,
where i is the relevant discount factor and N the lifetime of the house. For large N , as is rea-
sonable to assume for houses, the present value of the changes in taxes are well approximated
by ΔTax
i
. Thus the degree of housing capitalization deliver insights to the rationality and
eﬃciency of the housing market. If the residential housing market is completely rational and
eﬃcient, then only future unexpected tax changes can be transferred to future home own-
ers, and we should have full tax capitalization. The current study uses both cross-sectional
diﬀerences and time changes in the nominal tax rates to estimate the capitalization of taxes.
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We argue that the tax changes in relation to the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark were
completely exogenous of any factors plausibly inﬂuencing house prices.
Whereas the earlier literature only focuses on property taxes, we also look at the capi-
talization of municipal income taxes. Since Danes pay municipal income taxes in the mu-
nicipality where they reside, everything else equal, one should prefer living in a municipality
with lower taxes.
The purpose of the 2007 municipality reform was to better exploit economies of scale at
the municipal level by merging smaller municipalities. With the exemption of only four small
islands, all municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants had to merge with one or more nearby
municipalities in order to create a new municipality of at least 30,000 inhabitants. The new
municipalities set the new tax rates equal to an average of the tax rates of the municipalities
participating in the merger plus an adjustment for changes in the public service task oﬀered
by the municipalities2. The new municipalities had the option to set the tax rates lower
than this average plus an adjustment, but only 9 of the 98 municipalities chose to set the
income tax rates below the maximum allowed rate, and only 11 chose to set the property
tax rates below the allowed maximum. We instrument the tax rates after the reform with
the average of the merging municipalities previous tax rates, since this average is closely
related to the chosen tax rate, and is independent of any factors that might inﬂuence house
prices, like the economic situation in the municipality.
Of course the municipalities were free to change the level of public service provided, and
so we control for the level of public service. Because the quality of public service is hard to
measure, we instrument our service variable with the total school expenditure and the total
education expenditure in the municipality.
We ﬁnd that a 1%-point increase in the income tax rate lead to a drop in house prices
of 7.9% and a 1 -point increase in the property tax rate lead to a 1.1% drop in house
prices. The simple present value of a 1%-point perpetual income tax increase and of a 1 -
point property tax increase, relative to the median house price correspond to 7% and 3.3%,
repectively. Our ﬁndings are thus in line with predicted. This indicates that the housing
market eﬃciently incorporates taxes into house prices, similar to the ﬁndings of Palmon and
Smith (1998b).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 brieﬂy reviews related literature,
section 2.3 explains the municipality reform, section 2.4 discusses the data and summary
statistics, section 2.5 lays out the estimation strategy, 2.6 presents the results, and section
2.7 concludes.
2In connection with the reform some public service task previously deﬁned as state tasks were taken over
by the municipalities.
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2.2 Related Literature
Oates (1969) was the ﬁrst to formally test the extent of property tax capitalization. Where
full capitalization is said to occur, when controlling all other factors such as public service
and housing characteristics, the present value of tax diﬀerences equal the diﬀerences in
house prices. Oates (1969) used cross-sectional data on US property taxes. The study
was criticized by Pollakowski (1973) for not properly accounting for the diﬀerence in public
service levels. Since then many papers have attempted to estimate the degree of property tax
capitalization, with diﬀering ﬁndings and limited controls for the quality of public service.
Chinloy (1978) and Gronberg (1979) ﬁnd limited capitalization eﬀects, whereas Oates
(1969), Edel and Sclar (1974), Gustely (1976), and Yinger et al. (1988) report varying
degrees of tax capitalization. Oates (1973), Reinhard (1981), and Gallagher et al. (2013)
ﬁnd close to full or even over capitalization.
Palmon and Smith (1998b) and Palmon and Smith (1998a) are the ﬁrst study to properly
control for public service except schooling. They construct a quasi-experiment by subdivid-
ing houses into municipal utility districts (MUDs) that have similar service levels (except
for school quality), but varying eﬀective property taxes. This is an important improvement
compared to earlier identiﬁcation strategies, but still fails to eﬀectively control for public
school quality, which is shown to be priced by home owners in Black (1999).
The current study uses both variation in the cross-section of municipalities and over
time to estimate the capitalization of taxes. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst study to
have completely exogenous variation over time due to the municipality reform. Having both
cross-sectional and time-series variation should give us a better estimate of the eﬀect of
taxes on house prices.
2.3 The Danish Municipality Reform in 2007
In April 2004 the Danish government laid forth a proposal for a reform of the municipalities
and regions (“Amter”) in Denmark. The background for the proposal was the report from
the Structural Commission in January 2004. The idea was to better exploit economies of
scale by reducing the number of municipalities from 271 to 98 and thus increasing the size
of the municipalities. Furthermore, the 13 regions (“Amterne”) were replaced by 5 bigger
regions (“Regionerne”), where the new regions lost the ability to levy taxes, and their main
task would be hospital services. The reform took eﬀect from January 1st 2007.
In June 2005 the division of the new municipalities was established. Municipalities
smaller than 20,000 inhabitants should merge with other municipalities to create a new mu-
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nicipality of at least 30,000 inhabitants. 32 municipalities did not partake in any merger.
Figure 2.3 depicts the pre- and post-merger municipality size. Most of the municipalities
with less than 20,000 inhabitants (to the left of the vertical line) merge with other munic-
ipalities, creating a new larger municipality (mostly with more than 30,000 inhabitants -
observations above the horizontal line). The new merged municipalities of course had to set
new tax rates.
From 2001 there had been a tax freeze in Denmark. This was still the case during the
municipality reform. The tax freeze meant that there could not be municipal tax increases
at an aggregate level, so if one municipality decided to raise taxes another had to decrease
their taxes by an equal amount. The result was that municipal taxes remained almost
completely constant from 2001 to 2007.
Two municipal taxes directly aﬀect households in Denmark; the property tax and the
income tax. The municipal income tax is a tax on labor income, and before the reform in
2006, the income tax rates varied from 15.5% to 23.2% as seen from table 2. The municipal
property tax is a tax on the assessed value of the lot where a residential property is located.
Residential real estate is assessed in odd years. Thus, the only change in property taxes
between 2006 and 2007 is due to the reform, since the assessed lot values were not changed.
The municipal property tax rates in 2006 ranged from 6  to 24  as seen from the table
2.
Municipalities could not freely choose the tax rates. Instead they could choose to set the
rate equal to or lower than a maximum allowed rate. The maximum allowed tax rates were
calculated as an average of the merging municipalities’ previous tax rates plus an addition
due to the split of the region’s public service responsibilities between the state and the
municipalities and due to the municipalities taking over some of the state’s public service
tasks. To avoid the political battles over the new tax rates, and to prevent dramatic changes
in any one municipality’s tax rate, almost all municipalities chose to set the tax rates equal
to the maximum allowed rate. Only 8 of the 98 new municipalities chose to set the income
tax rates below the maximum allowed rate, and only 11 chose to set the property tax below
the maximum. The old region (“amt”) income tax rates were split as 8%-points to the state
income taxes, and the rest to the maximum allowed rate for the new municipal income
tax. The old region property tax rates were uniformly 10 , and they were added to the
maximum allowed rate of the new municipal property tax rates.
The changes in tax rates were a function of the previous tax rates in the municipalities
that happened to merge. The “choice” to merge was determined by the municipal size.
It seems reasonable to assume that the change in size of the municipality is independent
of factors aﬀecting house prices, since the change of geographical municipal boundary and
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the change in municipal size should not aﬀect house prices, when properly accounting for
changes in municipal factors such as taxes and service.
The selection of which municipalities to partake in a given merger depended on which
municipalities that were adjacent to each other. And since all merging municipalities had
to agree upon who to merge with, one could imagine that merging municipalities would be
similar in terms of tax rates and service levels. This could potentially lead to very small tax
changes. However, table 2 shows that both property tax rates and income tax rates changed
substantially due to the reform. A few municipalities failed to ﬁnd candidates to merge
with, and in these cases the national parliament decided which municipalities to merge.
Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the reform instigated a change in tax rates
that was exogenous to house prices. Speciﬁcally, it seems obvious that the tax changes were
independent of the economic situation of the individual municipalities, and thus serves as
good experiment to examine how exogenous changes in tax rates aﬀect house prices. Figure
2.1 shows the geographical distribution of the merging and non-merging municipalities. The
merging municipalities are located all over Denmark.
2.4 Data
To conduct the study, we have collected a very detailed description of the houses sold
including house-speciﬁc characteristics and spatial data, the municipal taxes, and the public
service levels before and after the municipal reform in Denmark in 2007. In the following
sections we describe the data sources and present summary statistics.
2.4.1 House Prices and Spatial Data
All Danish housing sales3 are recorded by the Danish tax authorities and are available
through the Danish public information server through www.OIS.dk. It includes sales prices,
size, number of rooms etc. for all Danish addresses back to 1992. We use residential house
prices from sales in 2006 and 2007. Our regressand is the natural logarithm of the sales
price.
We exclude family transactions. Family sales are easily identiﬁed in the dataset, because
all family sales are registered and marked as such. We also exclude forced sales, and thus
only include regular arms length sales in the dataset.
We focus only on the three biggest housing types in Denmark; regular houses, apart-
3Except the housing type “Andelsbolig”, which is a Danish cooperative housing type, that is governed
by very diﬀerent laws than regular home ownership.
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ments, and townhouses4. This is done to avoid special house types, that might be priced
diﬀerent than regular owner-occupied housing.
To deal with incorrectly registered sales we trim the data for the top and bottom 1%. We
have tried trimming the top and buttom 3, 2, and 0.5% instead, and it did not signiﬁcantly
change the results. Some of the houses in the data are listed as having been remodelled
after the sale in either 2006 and 2007, and since the database only records the current house
characteristics, we exclude all houses renovated after the sales date to avoid backdated
values.
All the addresses of the sold houses are geocoded with latitude and longitude coordinates,
and the municipal aﬃliation before and after the reform of each location is determined
through the Danish Geodata Agency’s (Geodatastyrelsen) mapping services “GeoVA” and
“GeoK7”.
The house characteristics are supplemented by the distance to the nearest big city in
Denmark. This spatial variable is meant to catch the eﬀects of living close to a big city, like
bigger job opportunities, better shopping facilities, closer proximity to schools etc.
2.4.2 Taxes and Public Service
In connection with the Danish municipality reform two tax rates aﬀecting private citizens
changed, the municipal property tax rate5 and the municipal income tax rate. Data on these
two taxes before and after the reform are from the Danish Ministry for Economic Aﬀairs
and the Interior available at www.noegletal.dk.
As part of the reform the previous regions called“Amter”were dismantled and the income
taxes previously collected by these regions were split between national taxes and municipal
taxes. 8 percentage-points of the regions income tax were converted into an 8% national
income tax, and the rest were added to the municipal income tax rate. The added part is
not an actual tax increase, since it is exactly oﬀset by the removal of the regional tax. Thus,
when comparing pre-reform tax rates to post-reform tax rates, the added part needs to be
subtracted the post-reform tax rates to correctly identify real tax changes.
The old regions also had a property tax on the value of each private lot. The tax rate
was uniformly 10  and this was added to the municipal property tax rate as part of the
reform. Again, we subtract 10  from the post-reform municipal property tax rate, since
this addition was exactly oﬀset by the removal of the regional property taxes.
Table 1 shows a ﬁctitious example of how the tax rates changed because of the reform for
households living in two merging municipalities, A and B. The municipalities in the example
4Villaer, ejerlejligheder, and rækkehuse in Danish.
5The municipal property tax is a tax on the current appraised value of each private property lot.
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belonged to diﬀerent counties (“Amter”) before the reform. The new merged municipality,
AB, sets the income tax rate equal to the average of the previous tax rates in A and B, plus
the part of the county tax rate above 8%, which is the part not transferred to the new state
health tax. The new municipal property tax rate is equal to the average of the previous
municipal property tax rates plus the county property tax rates (The county property tax
rates were uniformly 10  before the reform). However, the relevant tax changes exclude
the redistribution of the county tax rates. Hence, the relevant tax changes are shown in the
last rows in table 1.
The two municipalities, Værløse and Farum, were excluded from the sample, since even
though the two municipalities merged, the municipalities upheld diﬀerential tax rates even
after the reform. This was due to substantial debt and subsequent tax increases in Farum
brought on by fraud conducted by then Mayor in Farum, Peter Brixtofte.
To proxy for the quality of public service in a municipality we use a calculated measure
from www.noegletal.dk. It equals the net expenses used on public service divided by the
calculated need of public service taking the demography of the municipality into account.
It should, thus be a better measure of public service than simply the total expenditure
per capita, since the latter for example would overstate the service level in municipalities
with many elderly. A value of 1 indicates that the municipality uses the amount on service
justiﬁed by the demography and social needs of the municipality. A municipality could
thus for example spend a lot on the elderly, without it resulting in a higher service level,
if there are many elderly in the municipality. Hence, it should be a better service variable
than for example total expenditure per capita. A service value higher than 1 indicates that
the municipality uses more than its calculated need, and a value less than 1 would indicate
using less than the need. Our service variable will most likely be measured with error. To
alleviate this problem we instrument it with the total expenditure spent on schooling per
pupil and the total expenditure spent on general education per pupil in the municipality.
2.4.3 Summary Statistics
The dataset includes 64,299 sales in 2006 and 67,500 sales in 2007. Thus signiﬁcantly
expanding the number of observations compared to the earlier studies. As an example,
Palmon and Smith (1998b) relies on only 501 sales in the Houston area. The reason why we
focus on 2006 and 2007 is that the municipality reform took eﬀect on January 1st 2007. For
each sales we have collected the market price of the house, structural characteristics of the
house such as the size, the number of rooms, the age, and the distance to the nearest city
center. Furthermore, we have collected the municipal property tax, the income tax, and the
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public service level. The summary statistics are shown in table 2.
2006 and 2007 had similar amounts of sales. And in both years most villas were sold.
The structural housing variables are distributed similarly in the two years. The income tax
rates in 2006 vary from 15.5% to 23.2% and the property tax rates vary from 6  to 24 ,
thus providing substantial variation to estimate the tax eﬀect on house prices. The reform
led to 256 tax changes geographically located all over Denmark as seen from ﬁgure 2.1. 32
municipalities did not partake in a merger, and some municipalities were split, and the split
parts merged with diﬀerent municipalities.
The service variable equals the total expenditure on service in the municipality relative
to its calculated need given its demography. In 2007 the dispersion of both property tax
rates, the income tax rates, and the service levels were lower than in 2006. This is a direct
result of the merging municipalities setting common rates and service levels.
Both the income tax rates and the property tax rates vary substantially due to the
reform. From the summary statistics in table 2 it is seen that the changes in the income tax
rates ranged from -2.97 percentage points to 3.76 percentage points with a mean of -0.22
percentage points, and the changes in property tax rates ranged from -12.76  to 13.86 .
Thus, the reform had substantial impact on the tax rates in some municipalities. The large
variation in tax changes will help us in identifying the eﬀect on house prices.
2.5 Estimation Strategy and Identiﬁcation
To estimate the degree of tax capitalization we use a hedonic regression model (see Rosen
(1974)). The idea is that housing, even though being a diﬀerentiated product, can be
described by a vector of characteristics, over which individuals have preferences. These
characteristics can be house speciﬁc, location speciﬁc, or relate to the local public taxes and
services etc. The basic regression model is the following
log(Priceijt) = α + βxijt + γIT ITjt + γPTPTjt + γSSjt + λk + ρt + εijt, (2.1)
where i indexes the individual sales, j indexes the municipalities, and t indexes time. The
variables contained in x describe the house speciﬁc characteristics relevant for the price.
ITjt denotes the municipal income tax, PTjt denotes the municipal property tax, and Sjt
denotes the public service level in the municipality. λk are dummy variables for each of the
regional areas in Denmark called “Amter”, and ρt are monthly dummy variables to capture
the general time eﬀect. The εijt is the error term for each sale.
The semi-log speciﬁcation in equation 2.1 is chosen because it provides the best ﬁt of
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the data. The interpretation of the parameters in the semi-log speciﬁcation is the relative
change in the selling price, Price, of a 1 unit of change in the relevant explanatory variable
as seen from a simple application of the chain rule on equation 2.1. Shown below for the
property tax eﬀect (suppressing subscripts for clarity):
γPT =
∂log(Price)
∂PT
=
1
Price
∂Price
∂PT
=
∂Price
Price
∂PT
The number of rooms, the size of the house and the distance to the nearest city are in
natural logarithms. This gives a better ﬁt of the model. With the log speciﬁcation of the
explanatory variables the interpretation of the coeﬃcients becomes (suppressing subscripts
for clarity):
β =
∂log(Price)
∂log(x)
=
1
Price
∂Price
∂log(x)
=
1
Price
(
∂log(x)
∂Price
)−1
=
1
Price
(
1
x
∂x
∂Price
)−1
=
∂Price
Price
/∂x
x
Hence, a coeﬃcients in front of a variable in natural logarithm equal to 0.5 means that
a 1% increase in the explanatory variable results in a 0.5% increase in the house price.
After the reform, the merging municipalities were allowed to set the new tax rates lower
than or equal to the average of the previous tax rates in the merging municipalities plus
an addition due to increased costs because the municipalities took over some public service
tasks that were previously handled by the state. This means that some of the non-merging
municipalities actually raised their taxes, and that the merging municipalities could set their
tax rates higher than the average of previous rates. Furthermore, municipalities could also
choose to set the tax rates lower than this calculated maximum. Using the actual tax rates
could introduce bias, if for example municipalities in a good economic situation chose to set
lower rates.
We therefore choose to instrument the tax rates by the average of the previous rates
in the merging municipalities. These instruments are functions of the municipalities being
bigger or smaller than 20,000 inhabitants, and the tax rates in the merging/neighboring
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municipalities. The instrumental variables are thus unrelated to the economic situation in
the municipalities, and therefore pose good instruments, if their are related to the actual
tax rates. We estimate the model by two stage least squares (2SLS).
The instruments are, however, not unrelated to the level of public service. One could
easily imagine that a municipality with high tax rates and high service levels merging with a
municipality with low tax rates and service levels, would experience a drop in public service.
We will thus need to control for the public service level.
For the 2SLS regression we use median values of sales prices, sizes, number of rooms,
etc. for each of the municipalities. This is done to deal with error correlation between sales
within the same municipality. The speciﬁcation hence becomes:
log(Pricejt) = α + βxjt + γIT ITjt + γPTPTjt + γSSjt + λj + ρt + εjt, (2.2)
2.6 Results
The results from estimating equation (2.1) by simple ordinary least squares (OLS) are
presented in table 3. In the M1 column the standard errors are clustered on the old mu-
nicipalities, to deal with residual correlation between sales within the same municipality.
We include monthly time dummy variables to pick up any common time series eﬀect. To
account for geographical diﬀerences in the pricing of houses in Denmark a regional factor
is included corresponding the old Danish regions called “Amter”, which were replaced by 5
bigger regions, “Regionerne”, as part of the reform. Ideally the model should include ﬁxed
eﬀects for each old municipality to isolate the pure eﬀect of the reform (diﬀerence over time),
and not allow for any cross-sectional variation driving the results. However, in unreported
results include old municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, both the income tax and property tax loose
statistical signiﬁcance. The model including municipal ﬁxed eﬀects only has the time series
variation to estimate the tax eﬀects. Unfortunately, we need the cross-sectional variation
between municipalities in order to get statistical signiﬁcance.
It is noticeable that the model with an R2 of 44% does a reasonably good job explaining
the variation in the data, even though the dataset covers sales from all of Denmark. This
indicates that the housing characteristics explain most of the house price variation, which
is needed to pick up any tax eﬀects.
All the housing characteristic have the expected signs. Not surprisingly, the size of the
house and the distance to the nearest city are most important in explaining the sales price.
A 1% increase in the distance to the nearest city leads to a 0.097% drop in house prices.
A 1% increase in the size leads to an increase in price of 0.748%. The number of rooms
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also positively inﬂuence the house price. The age of the house is negatively related to the
price, but the squared age is positively related, indicating that really old houses often are
better located and have more charm. Townhouses and villas sell at a discount compared to
apartments, but the eﬀect of townhouses disappears in M1, where the standard errors are
clustered on old municipalities, and the discount on villas is only barely signiﬁcant at the
5% level.
In column M2, without standard error clustering, both the income tax rate and the
property tax rate are statistically signiﬁcant and inﬂuence house prices negatively. A 1
percentage-point increase in income tax rate leads to a 4.4% drop in house prices. A 1
permille-point increase in the property tax rate, leads to house prices falling by 0.3%. When
clustering standard errors on old municipalities (column M1), the property tax is no longer
signiﬁcant.
However, using the actual 2007 post reform tax rates might bias the results, since munici-
palities were free to set taxes below the average of the previous tax rates plus an addition due
to municipalities taking over some public service tasks from the state. This addition do not
constitute a tax increase, but merely a redistribution of taxes and tasks between the state
and the municipal level. Furthermore, the freedom to set the tax rates below the threshold,
might introduce a bias, since municipalities in good economic situations might choose to
lower taxes. Becuase the overall economic situation in the municipality also directly aﬀect
house prices, this will lead to endogeneity.
The problem can be circumvented by instrumenting the tax rates by a variable that for
the 2006 values equal the 2006 tax rates, but for 2007 equals the average of the previous
rates in the merging municipalities. For municipalities not participating in a merger, the
2007 values just equal their 2006 values. These two instruments, one for the income tax
and one for the property tax, will be independent of the economic situation in each of the
municipalities, since it is simply a function of the merger rule (below 20,000 inhabitants),
and the tax rates in the neighboring municipalities. Intuitively, the instruments should also
be highly correlated with the actual tax rates, since the average previous tax rates were also
part of the actual 2007 tax rates.
Table 4 shows the 2SLS estimation instrumenting the income tax and the property tax
by the aforementioned variables. All variables are in medians per old municipality, to avoid
error correlation between sales in the same municipality. The “First Stage” columns shows
that the instruments are indeed highly correlated with the actual tax rates conditional on
the exogenous covariates. We, thus, avoid the potential pitfalls in using weak instruments.
The “First Stage” regressions are only to show the correlation between the instruments and
the actual tax rates. The model is not actually estimated in 2 stages, since this would lead
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to incorrect standard errors in the second stage.
The“Second Stage”column shows the results from the 2SLS estimation using the two tax
rate instruments. The housing characteristics all have the expected signs and are of similar
magnitude to the OLS results in table 3. Both the R2 and the adjusted R2 are 71%. The
increased ﬁt is due to the data being median values per municipality in the 2SLS regressions
as opposed to individual sales in the simple OLS estimation. The eﬀects of both tax rates
are more signiﬁcant both economically and statistically compared to the OLS results in table
3. A 1 percentage-point increase in income tax rate lead to a 6.8% drop in house prices. A
1 permille-point increase in the property tax rate, lead to house prices falling by 0.9%.
The results does, however, not control for diﬀerences in public service. To address this, we
add a service variable to the speciﬁcation. It equals the net expenses used on public service
divided by the calculated need, given the demography of the municipality. Acknowledging
that public service is hard to measure, we instrument it by school expenditure per pupil and
total educational expenditure per pupil. The results are shown in table 5.
Again the “First Stage” columns show the conditional correlation of the instruments
with the respective variables. It is noticeable that the two instruments for service are not
as strongly related to our service variable as the tax rate instruments. It is not a major
concern for us, as we are not interested in the eﬀect of public service on house prices, but
only wish to control for public service diﬀerences.
The “Second Stage” column shows the results of the 2SLS estimation. Again, all the
housing characteristics have the right signs and similar magnitude as in the previous regres-
sions. The service level is positively related to house prices, but is only signiﬁcant at the
5% conﬁdence level. The economic magnitude is also quite small. Increasing the service
level from 1 to 2, indicating spending twice as much on service as the calculated need, only
increases house prices 11.9%. The low estimate is probably partly due to measurement error
inducing attenuation bias (estimate is biased towards 0), given that our service instruments
are far from perfect.
Controlling for service raises the estimates of both the property tax rate and the income
tax rate as expected. A 1%-point increase in income tax rate leads to a 7.9% drop in house
prices. A 1 -point increase in the property tax rate, leads to house prices falling by 1.1%.
One obvious question to consider when using a political reform as a natural experiment,
is whether people foresaw the tax changes prior to January 1st 2007. The actual 2007 tax
rates were announced on October 15th 2006, however, the tax changes could have been
incorporated into property values before this, if people foresaw the changes. This could bias
our results towards 0. The number of Google searches related to the reform in ﬁgure 2.2)
does indicate some peaks in attention prior to January 1st 2007.
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To control for this we have tried using 2003 as the pre-event period and 2007 as the
post-event period. In 2003 there was no talk about the municipality reform. The estimated
coeﬃcients in front of the income and the property tax rates become -5.6% and -0.9%,
respectively. These estimates are in the same order of magnitude (and actually a bit closer
to 0) as the previous results. The anticipation bias, hence, does seem to be a serious issue.
If people assume tax rates to be constant over time, then it is possible to calculate the
present value for a 1% tax diﬀerence by assuming a discount rate. We can then compare
this theoretical tax beneﬁt/loss to the estimated results in table 5, and ﬁnd the degree of
tax capitalization.
The present value for the median household of a perpetual 1%-point diﬀerence in the
income tax rate, assuming constant household income, is
ΔIT ∗median taxable income
r
=
1% ∗ 315, 043
0.3
= 105, 014.
We follow Yinger et al. (1988) and Palmon and Smith (1998b) and use a discount rate
of 3%. With a median house price in 2007 of 1,500,000, this gives a relative eﬀect of -7,0%
for a 1%-point tax increase6. This is very close to the estimated -7.9 from table 5, and it
corresponds to a capitalization of −7.9/ − 7 ≈ 110%, indicating that the housing market
fully incorporates the eﬀect of tax diﬀerences and changes into house prices. This result is
in line with Oates (1973), Reinhard (1981), and Gallagher et al. (2013) that all ﬁnd close
to a 100% tax capitalization. They, however, focus on property taxes.
Assuming property taxes are paid out of sales prices, or equivalently, that appraisal
values equal sales prices, and inﬁnite lifetime for properties, the present value of a 1 -point
diﬀerence in property tax rate (assuming constant house values) for the median household
equals
ΔPT ∗median house value
r
=
1  ∗ 1, 500, 000
0.3
= 50, 000
The relative eﬀect of a 1 -point increase in property tax rates thus equals 0.001
0.03
=
50, 000/1, 500, 000 ≈ 3.3%. This is indicates a degree of property tax capitalization of 33%.
This assumes that property taxes are paid on property sales prices. In reality, property
taxes are paid on the assessed value of the lot, on which the property is placed. The true
property tax capitalization will thus probably be higher than 33%.
Another way to get the degree of property tax capitalization is by noting that that the
house price is a function of housing characteristics, f(x), ie. size, location etc. less the
6The 2007 median taxable income of 315,043 is from Statistics Denmark www.dst.dk.
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property taxes
P = f(x)− αPT ∗ P
i
↔ P = f(x)
1 + αPT
i
where α is the degree of property tax capitalization, i is the relevant discount rate, and PT
is the property tax rate. By taking the natural logaritm of both sides, this becomes
ln(P ) = ln(f(x))− ln(1 + αPT
i
) ≈ ln(f(x))− αPT
i
(2.3)
where the approximation works well for small values of PT
i
. Equation (2.3) corresponds to
the estimated equation, and the degree of property tax capitalization can thus be recovered
directly from our results as the coeﬃcient in front of the property tax rate divided by −i.
This assumes that the approximation in equation (2.3) is accurate, and that property taxes
are paid on property sales prices. As previously mentioned, property taxes are paid on the
assessed value of the lot, on which the property is placed. Using this methodology the degree
of tax capitalization becomes
α =
−1.1%
−3% = 36.7%,
which is close the previous result. Since the precise degree of capitalization is highly de-
pendent upon the assumed discount rate, the overall conclusion is that our ﬁndings are in
line with predicted values, and suggest that the housing market does incorporate taxes into
house prices.
2.7 Conclusion
Everything else equal people should prefer lower taxes to higher taxes. So if one municipality
has higher tax rates than another municipality with the same level of public service, people
can “vote with their feet” and move to the municipality with lower as argued by Tiebout
(1956). This mechanism should lead to taxes being capitalized into house prices.
We utilize the 2007 municipality reform in Denmark as a natural experiment to estimate
the eﬀect of property tax rates and income tax rates on house prices. We are, hence, able
to obtain exogenous cross-sectional and time series variation in tax rates, yielding a dataset
of about 600 municipal-year observations.
We ﬁnd that a 1%-point increase in income tax rate lead to a 7.9% drop in house
prices, and 1 -point increase in the property tax rate, lead to house prices falling by 1.1%.
Calculating simple present values of tax changes for the average household yields eﬀects of
7% and 3.3% for the income tax and the property tax, respectively. Our results fall quite
close to these, and indicates that the residential housing market does incorporate taxes into
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house prices.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Municipality reform in Denmark. This ﬁgure show a map of Denmark with 271 munici-
palities divided into merging and non-merging municipalities under 2007 municipality reform.
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Figure 2.2: Google trend searches. This ﬁgure show a time-series of Google searches concerning
municipality reform in Denmark. The numbers reﬂect how frequently a given entry (Strukturreformen) was
searched relative to the highest frequency point of time. Value of 100 means the greatest popularity, value
of 50 suggests that the popularity has been decreasing. If the popularity of Strukturreformen was less than
1% compared to the period of greatest popularity we assign a value of 0.
83
Figure 2.3: Population size in merged and non-merged municipalities. According to municipality
reform, municipalities smaller than 20,000 (to the left of the vertical line) were supposed to merge with
other municipalities to create a new municipality of at least 30,000 in habitants (above the horizontal line).
This ﬁgure reports 2007 municipality population sizes in thousands and only for municipalities with less
then 80,000 inhabitants in 2006. There were only ﬁve municipalities with number of inhabitants larger than
80,000 in 2006: Frederiksberg, Aalborg, Odense, Aarhus, København.
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2.9 Tables
Table 1: A tax rate change example. A ﬁctitious example of how the tax rates changed because of
the reform for households living in two merging municipalities, A and B. The municipalities in the example
belonged to diﬀerent counties (“Amter”) before the reform.
A B
Municipal income tax rate 20% 16%
Before the reform Municipal property tax rate 8  10 
County income tax rate 12% 14%
County property tax rate 10  10 
AB
After the reform Municipal income tax rate 20+(12−8)+16+(14−8)2 = 23%
Municipal property tax rate 8+10+10+102 = 19 
A B
Relevant tax changes Municipal income tax rate 23-20-(12-8)=-1% 23-16-(14-8)=1%
Municipal property tax rate 19-8-10=1  19-10-10=-1 
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Table 3: OLS regression of house prices on tax changes. This table presents OLS panel regressions
for period 2006-2007, where log house price is regressed on the municipality income and property tax, and
a vector of house characteristics such as log number of rooms, log distance to the city, log size, age, squared
age, house type dummy variable (townhouse, villa and apartment). There is month ﬁxed eﬀect included in
both of the regressions. In the ﬁrst model (M1) there is also amt ﬁxed eﬀect and errors are cluster by each
old municipality. In the second model (M2) there is amt ﬁxed eﬀect as well, however the errors are not
clustered. The t-statistics are provided in the brackets.
Parameter M1 M2
Intercept
12.382 12.382
(35.83) (214.09)
Income Tax(%)
-0.044 -0.044
(-2.69) (-19.48)
Property Tax( )
-0.003 -0.003
(-0.96) (-7.67)
log(No. of rooms)
0.094 0.094
(8.56) (12.76)
log(Distance to city) (m)
-0.097 -0.097
(-9.78) (-80.54)
log(Size) (m2)
0.748 0.748
(50.68) (99.65)
Age in years
-0.008 -0.008
(-25.47) (-68.07)
Age2 · 103 0.030 0.030
(21.13) (44.58)
Housing Type: -0.031 -0.031
Townhouse (-0.71) (-4.28)
Housing Type: -0.091 -0.091
Villa (-2.02) (-14.85)
Monthly dummy variable Yes Yes
Amt Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes
Municipality Error Clustering Yes No
R2 0.44 0.44
Adj-R2 0.44 0.44
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Table 4: Two stage least square regression of house prices and instrumented tax changes. This
table presents two stage least square estimation with two endogenous variable: income tax and property
tax. The intended income and property tax are used as instrumental variables for income and property
tax, respectively. Amt and month ﬁxed eﬀect are included in each of the regressions. The second and
third column show coeﬃcient estimates from the ﬁrst stage least square estimation, whereas the last column
presents the coeﬃcients from the second stage where the median log house price in each old municipality is
regressed on income tax and property tax from the ﬁrst stage and other covariates: median old municipality
log number of rooms, log distance to city, log size, age, squared age, house type. The two last raw show the
R2 and adjusted R2 for each of the regression. The t-statistics are provided in the brackets.
Parameter First Stage Second Stage
Property Income
log(House Price)
Tax Tax
Intercept
0.562 -1.799 13.274
(0.73) (-7.39) (85.68)
Tax Income (%)
-0.068
(-14.86)
IV-Intended Income 1.046
Tax (%) (142.48)
Tax Property (%)
-0.009
(-10.90)
IV-Intended Property 1.007
Tax (%) (205.15)
log(No. of rooms)
-0.244 -0.011 0.063
(-1.51) (-0.27) (2.37)
log(Distance to city) (m)
0.062 0.012 -0.078
(2.97) (2.28) (-22.95)
log(Size) (m2)
0.145 0.124 0.675
(0.81) (2.78) (23.01)
Age in years
-0.002 0.000 -0.007
(-0.49) (0.39) (-11.96)
Age2 · 103 -0.005 -0.009 0.024
(-0.18) (-1.43) (5.62)
Housing Type: -1.220 -0.029 -0.115
Townhouse (-4.95) (-0.46) (-2.83)
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Housing Type: -0.894 -0.121 -0.324
Villa (-4.49) (-2.41) (-9.84)
Monthly dummy variable Yes Yes Yes
Amt Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.92 0.85 0.71
Adj-R2 0.92 0.85 0.71
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Table 5: Two stage least square regression of house prices on tax and service changes. This
table presents two stage least square estimation with multiple endogenous variable: income tax, property
tax and service. The intended income and property tax are used as instrumental variables for income and
property tax, respectively. Service is instrumented by education expenditures and state school expenditures.
Amt and month ﬁxed eﬀect are included in each of the regressions. The second, third and fourth column
show coeﬃcient estimates from the ﬁrst stage least square estimation, whereas the last column presents the
coeﬃcients from the second stage where the median log house price in each old municipality is regressed on
income tax, property tax and service from the ﬁrst stage and other covariates: median old municipality log
number of rooms, log distance to city, log size, age, squared age, house type. The two last raw show the R2
and adjusted R2 for each of the regression. The t-statistics are provided in the brackets.
Parameter First Stage Second Stage
Property Income
Service log(House Price)
Tax Tax
Intercept
0.535 -1.794 1690.7 13.358
( 0.69) (-7.33 ) (3.91 ) (76.11 )
Income Tax (%)
-0.079
(-11.95 )
IV-Intended Income 1.045
Tax (%) (141.65 )
Property Tax ( )
-0.011
( -7.66)
IV-Intended Property 1.007
Tax ( ) ( 204.62)
Service·103 0.119
( 2.14)
Education Expenditure
-0.108
( -2.26)
State School -69.02
Expenditure (-5.59 )
log(No. of rooms)
-0.241 -0.011 84.050 0.049
( -1.49) (-0.28 ) ( 0.94) ( 1.65)
log(Distance to city) (m)
0.059 0.012 -38.96 -0.072
( 2.83) ( 2.31) (-3.38 ) (-16.19 )
log(Size) (m2)
0.156 0.125 -152.8 0.696
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( 0.87) (2.77 ) ( -1.54) (20.88 )
Age in years
-0.002 0.000 4.602 -0.008
( -0.49) (0.39 ) (2.28 ) ( -10.99)
Age2 · 103 -0.005 -0.009 -13.681 0.025
( -0.21) (-1.43 ) (-0.95 ) (5.23 )
Housing Type: -1.232 -0.027 502.56 -0.153
Townhouse ( -4.98) ( -0.44) (3.67) (-3.13 )
Housing Type: -0.909 -0.120 534.616 -0.367
Villa (-4.54 ) ( -2.39) (4.84 ) ( -8.81)
Monthly dummy variable Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amt Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.92 0.85 0.32 0.67
Adj-R2 0.92 0.84 0.32 0.67
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Essay 3
Local Economic Conditions and Local
Equity Preferences: Evidence from
Mutual Funds during the U.S.
Housing Boom and Bust1
1We thank Susan Christoﬀersen and Christian Laux and seminar participants at the Copenhagen Business
School.
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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of local economic conditions on mutual fund pref-
erences for geographically proximate stocks and consequent fund performance. Specif-
ically, we demonstrate that mutual funds favour ﬁrms located within close geographic
proximity and that the strength of these preferences vary with local housing price
shocks. A decrease in local house prices is strongly associated with an increase in
mutual fund home bias and results in a portfolio adjustment towards safer and higher
quality holdings. This portfolio adjustment subsequently reduces mutual fund perfor-
mance: a one percentage point increase in home bias causes a decrease in a fund’s
3-month DGTW adjusted future return by 35.3 bsp.
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Mutual funds operate in and react to changing economic conditions. Recent empirical
and theoretical studies have shown that external conditions aﬀect mutual fund performance
and asset allocation decisions.2 While previous research documents a strong relationship be-
tween market-wide conditions (e.g. business cycle) and fund returns, there is relatively little
known about how local economic conditions aﬀect a fund’s asset management and, conse-
quently, performance. In particular, time-varying local conditions may fuel fund manager’s
intrinsic biases and aﬀect a fund’s performance.
We attempt to ﬁll the gap in the literature by examining how variation in local house
prices aﬀects mutual fund preferences towards geographically proximate stocks. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study directly relating local economic conditions (proxied by lo-
cal house price growth) to mutual fund portfolio choices and performance.3 Recent studies
document that mutual funds prefer assets with nearby headquarters. However, the mech-
anism driving local equity preference is subject to ongoing debate. The ﬁnance literature
oﬀers two main hypothesis explaining investors’ home bias: informational advantage and
familiarity bias. For example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner
(2005) argue that fund managers have superior information concerning local stocks. On
the other hand, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Seasholes and Zhu (2010), and Pool et al.
(2012) argue that investors’ preferences towards local stocks are driven by familiarity bias.
By examining the relationship between local house price growth and mutual fund port-
folio choices, we aim to contribute to the discussion on the mechanisms driving local equity
preferences. Previous literature examines the level or degree of mutual fund home bias, and
explanations based on information advantage or familiarity relate to fund or asset character-
istics. In contrast, we examine how the degree of home bias changes in response to changes
in the fund’s external environment. We ﬁnd that mutual funds respond to changes in local
housing prices by shifting the degree of home bias in their equity portfolios; negative house
price shocks cause funds to tilt their portfolio in favour of nearby equity holdings. However,
we do not ﬁnd that housing price shocks are related to what we call ‘fund tangibles’ (net
ﬂows, liquidity position, etc.). Thus, the relationship between the home bias and house price
shocks that we document is not being driven by fund investors’ reaction to a change in local
economic conditions. We argue that asset information advantage or familiarity are unrelated
2e.g. Ferson and Schadt (1996), Elton et al. (1995), Vayanos (2004), and Korniotis and Kumar (2013).
3We believe that house price growth is a good indicator of local economic conditions. For example,
Leamer (2007) argues that housing is the most important sector in economic recessions. In a series of
papers, Mian and Suﬁ (2011); Mian et al. (2013), and Mian and Suﬁ (2014) document that exogenous
local house price shocks have strong eﬀects on local demand. Charles et al. (2016) show that the housing
demand was a strong predictor of the employment-to-population ratio of US metropolitan areas in the 2000s.
Stroebel and Vavra (2014) show that local house price growth is associated with local retail prices, and that
the link is driven by demand or local consumer behaviour.
95
to local housing price shocks. For example, we do not expect local information availability to
be systematically related to the magnitude of house price growth during the housing boom.
Thus, our ﬁndings suggest a bias in fund manager behaviour that is unrelated to information
or familiarity. This previously undocumented behavioural bias is of ﬁrst order importance,
as the shift in mutual fund preferences towards local stocks induced by deterioration in local
economic conditions is associated with mutual fund underperformance.
Our paper uses data on US open-ended mutual funds from Morningstar. Our sample
includes mutual funds that actively invest in US equity between January 2002 and December
2009. We split our sample into two time periods to exploit the dramatic changes in housing
prices across the US during the housing boom (2002-2005) and bust (2006-2009). Our
data on housing prices are extracted from Zillow and aggregated to the CBSA level, which
we refer to as cities. We then match mutual funds to cities using the location of the
mutual fund’s head oﬃce to create a panel of data covering our two time periods. The key
relationship we investigate is how local housing price shocks aﬀect mutual fund portfolio
choices. To motivate this relationship, consider Figure 3.1, which plots the annual fraction
of a fund’s portfolio held in local stocks (within 100 km) and mean housing prices across
the US. The aggregate data suggests that the degree of mutual fund home bias is inversely
related to US housing prices. While this time-series relationship is suggestive, we aim to
isolate a causal relationship by exploiting the cross-section dimension of our panel and
asking whether portfolio shifts in the fraction of local equity holdings are stronger in cities
with larger house price shocks. Our empirical strategy is similar to Mian and Suﬁ (2011);
Mian et al. (2013); Mian and Suﬁ (2014) who exploit the large variation of house price
appreciation and depreciation across cities during the housing boom and bust. We relate
house price growth to mutual fund portfolio adjustments at the city-level using a ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced regression framework. While this approach controls for time-invariant factors
related to city-level house prices and manager behaviour, there is the potential for time-
varying omitted factors to confound our estimates. Thus, we use the Saiz (2010) measure
of topographical land constraint as an instrument to isolate exogenous variation in house
price growth as in Mian and Suﬁ (2011).
Our investigation begins by analysing whether local economic conditions aﬀect mutual
fund net-ﬂows or liquidity decisions. Investor withdrawals in response to local economic
downturns, for example, may cause fund managers to rationally alter their portfolio com-
position. Both OLS and IV results indicate that investors’ demand and supply of cash is
unresponsive to the variation in local economic conditions. We also ﬁnd that fund cash, US
equity holdings, and active liquidity management do not covary with housing price shocks.
Taken together, these results suggest that housing price shocks do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
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investors liquidity demand and, thus, do not create a fundamental need for funds to alter
their asset allocation strategies.
We then examine our main relationship of interest by creating several measures of home
bias and relating these measures to local housing price growth. Our main measure of home
bias is a weighted average of the distance between fund headquarters and the ﬁrm headquar-
ters of each asset in their portfolio, where the weights are the share of the asset within the
portfolio. We calculate this measure at the beginning and the end of our two sub-periods
for each fund, and we document that the average city-level change in home bias is strongly
related to house price growth. We show that this relationship is not being driven by any
particular city and is robust to alternative measures of home bias. Moreover, this relation-
ship is present in each sub-period: During the boom, cities that experienced larger positive
house price growth reduced their home bias the most, while during the bust, cities that
experienced larger negative house price growth increased their home bias the most. We ﬁnd
that a one percentage point reduction in house prices is associated with a decrease in mean
distance between a mutual fund and its holdings by 36 km and increases the fraction of local
assets in a fund’s portfolio by 0.73 percentage points. Figure 3.2 depicts our basic reduced
form results. The ﬁgure contains four panels, where the panels on the left show two key
relationships during the housing boom. In particular, the top left panel shows that housing
prices grew more in cities that were more constrained. In the bottom left panel, we show
that home bias decreases more in constrained cities. The panels on the right document the
symmetry of our results: more constrained cities had larger declines in house prices and
increases in home bias.
In order to better understand these results, we investigate whether local economic con-
ditions are related to other types of shifts in portfolio composition. To do this, we use stock
quality and safety measures constructed by Asness et al. (2013). We create an index of
portfolio quality for each fund by computing a share weighted average of asset quality. We
construct an index of portfolio safety in the same way. We show that shifts in portfolio
quality and safety are strongly related to house price growth. In particular, when house
prices fall, funds increase both the safety and quality of their portfolios. This is suggestive
evidence that mutual fund managers may be responding to perceived risk or uncertainty
when local economic conditions shift. We further investigate this by splitting the holdings
of each fund into local and distant stocks, and examine quality and safety shifts within each
of these sub-portfolios. We ﬁnd that mutual funds adjust the quality of both the local and
distant components of their portfolios in response to house price shocks, but only adjust the
safety of the distant portfolio. This may suggest that fund managers perceive local holdings
to be safer.
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Finally, we investigate the consequences of house price driven portfolio shifts in terms
of fund performance. To begin, we relate future fund performance directly with local house
price shocks. We ﬁnd that a one percentage point reduction in local house prices is associated
with a 25 bsp and 51 bsp decrease in future 3- and 6-month characteristic-adjusted returns,
respectively. We then split fund portfolios into local and distant stocks, and calculate the
future performance of each sub-portfolio. We ﬁnd that underperformance is concentrated
in the portfolio of local stocks. We view these relationships as reduce-form, but we are
more interested in the relationship between future performance and changes in funds’ home
bias. To overcome endogeneity issues, we instrument our measures of home bias with the
Saiz (2010) measure of local land constraints. Not surprisingly given our results above,
local land constraints are strongly related to measures of home bias. In particular, during
the housing bust, mutual funds in more constrained cities became more home biased, and
vice versa in the boom period. Our two-stage least squares estimates suggest that home
bias causes underperformance. A one percent increase in the fraction of local stocks in
a portfolio decreases 6-month characteristic-adjusted returns by 69.9 basis points. The
negative relationship between future performance and shifts in favouritism toward local
stocks are robust across diﬀerent measures of home bias and stronger after 5 months. Thus,
our results suggest that shifts in portfolio composition that are driven by housing price
shocks are not informed adjustments.
Our paper contributes to the active and growing literature that investigates the relation-
ship between portfolio decisions and the experiences of managers. This literature documents
that portfolio decisions are impacted by manager age, gender, experience, political views,
manager-director college networks, or even local religious beliefs.4 Additionally, mutual
funds have been shown to be home bias in their preference for domestic assets over foreign
ones, and also within the US for geographical proximate ﬁrms. Our paper investigates how
the strength of these local preferences shift with local external conditions. We show that
city-level housing price shocks (1) do not impact fund tangibles, such as net-ﬂows, and thus
create no fundamental need to alter funds’ portfolios, (2) symmetrically impact measures of
funds’ home bias, and portfolio quality and safety, and (3) drive shifts in fund home bias that
are signiﬁcantly related to fund performance. While the ﬁnance literature largely focuses on
the information advantages and familiarity hypothesises to explain home bias, our results
4Barber and Odean (2001) ﬁnd that male investors are more overconﬁdent and are characterized by
excessive trading. Cohen et al. (2008) document that a fund manager asset allocation decision is strongly
inﬂuenced by connections with ﬁrm board members, that used to go to the same collage as the fund manager.
Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) ﬁnd evidence that fund managers who donate money to political campaigns
are less likely to invest in socially irresponsible companies. Shu et al. (2012) document that mutual fund
located in areas with high fraction of Catholics have stronger preferences for high volatility assets than funds
domiciled in Protestant-dominated areas.
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suggest that other biases are at play. In particular, the symmetry of the impact of positive
and negative house price shocks suggests that fund managers are responding to perceived
risk and view local assets as relatively safe. The behaviour we document cannot be explained
by information advantage, since negative shocks lead to fund underperformance. Nor can
they be explained by familiarity since positive shocks reduce local favouritism and, thus,
funds do not simply “invest in what they know” (Pool et al., 2012). Rather, our ﬁndings
suggest that fund reaction to house price shocks reﬂects a response to perceived risk and
fund managers view local assets as being safer, and this behavioural bias leads to poorer
fund performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we relate our analysis to the
existing literature. In section 3.2, we describe the data and the variable construction in
detail. In Section 3.3, we explain our approach to estimation. Section 3.4 reports the
empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to, and combines, three lines of literature. First, we contribute to
the discussion on the origin of home bias. Second, the paper adds to a relatively new and
growing strand of literature discussing the impact of personal traits and biases on investors’
decisions. The third contribution of our analysis lies in an examining how mutual fund
manager’s decisions are aﬀected by changing local (economic) conditions.
3.1.1 Importance of mutual fund location
This paper contributes to the literature on the importance of mutual fund location. Previous
studies mainly focus on informational advantages versus behavioural biases stemming from
fund location relative to the stocks in his portfolio. Yet there is little consensus regarding
the importance of a manager’s familiarity with a stock in portfolio selection decision. Co-
val and Moskowitz (2001) argue that fund managers have superior information about local
stocks, which is reﬂected in high abnormal returns generated by those holdings. Ivkovic´ and
Weisbenner (2005) come to similar conclusion by looking at individual investors’ portfolios.
However, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Huberman (2001), and Seasholes and Zhu (2010)
ﬁnd opposite evidence. They argue that fund managers familiarity bias results in over-
weighting local stocks in a fund’s portfolio and consequently in a lower fund’s performance.
Fund manager’s behaviour can also be aﬀected by local culture. According to Shu et al.
(2012), local religious beliefs aﬀect mutual fund managers’ risk taking behaviour (return
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volatility, portfolio concentration, turnover, absolute return gap, and tournament-related
competition), though highly competitive environment. Previous studies provide evidence of
information spill-over eﬀects within a city. Hong et al. (2005) document that fund’s man-
ager trading decisions are more susceptible to the trades of other managers in the same city
than to the trades of managers from a diﬀerent city, suggesting an information transmission
across mutual funds located in the same city. A city’s demographics also seem to notably
aﬀect fund manager behaviour.5 Christoﬀersen and Sarkissian (2009) document a positive
correlation between mutual fund performance and the city size. They argue that this rela-
tionship is mainly due to managers with greater experience. This indicates that large cities
produce learning externalities that fund manager take advantage of.
3.1.2 Personal traits and biases
Our paper contribute to existing literature on investors personal biases and traits. The
eﬀect of overconﬁdence on managers’ decision making has been studied by both empiricists
and theorists. For example, Daniel et al. (1998) and Odean (1998) argue in their theoretical
frameworks that overconﬁdent investors trade more frequently, which may not counterbal-
ance average trading costs. According to Odean (1999) and Barber and Odean (2001),
overconﬁdence induced excessive trading is associated with underperformance among in-
dividual investors. Christoﬀersen and Sarkissian (2011) relate a mutual fund turnover to
manager’s biases and characteristics. They ﬁnd that inexperienced, more educated male
managers located in ﬁnancial centres increase their trading after recent good performance.
But gradually, they recognize their true abilities and decrease their trading frequency over
time. Bodnaruk and Simonov (2016) investigate how institutional investors aversion to
losses (disposition eﬀect) aﬀects a portfolio’s composition and performance. They argue
that institutional investors with loss-aversion manage portfolios with lower downside risk,
perform more poorly, and have shorter careers in asset management. Managers’ personal
traits and biases do not only aﬀect asset allocation decision of institutional investors, they
are also reﬂected in corporate ﬁnance decision making.6
3.1.3 Time-varying economic conditions
Finally, this paper is related to studies that link both mutual fund performance and man-
ager’s behaviour to the variation in economic conditions over time. Previous research pro-
5See Christoﬀersen and Sarkissian (2011).
6See e.g. Malmendier and Tate (2005), Cronqvist et al. (2012), or Malmendier et al. (2011).
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vides an evidence of time-varying mutual fund alphas and betas.7 Glode (2011) claims
that while mutual funds underperform in expansion periods, they outperform in recessions.
Kacperczyk et al. (2014) argue that mutual fund manager’s skills varies overtime. Their
results suggest that successful managers adroitly pick stocks in booms and time the market
well in recessions.8 Further, mutual fund managers actively manage portfolio’s liquidity
in response to time-varying market volatility. Rzez´nik (2016) shows that fund managers
actively tilt their portfolio towards more liquid assets in face of market volatility induced
outﬂows.9 Last, our study is closely related to Pool et al. (2014). They focus on the impact
of shocks to manager’s wealth (due to real estate bubble burst) on his risk-taking behaviour.
They argue that a manager experiencing shocks to his wealth decreases the riskiness of his
portfolio relative to a manager who does not experience any wealth shock. Our analysis,
however, uses the variation in house price changes to provide a potential explanation for fund
manager’s preferences toward geographically proximate securities. We show that a mutual
fund adjusts its degree of home bias in response to changes in local economic conditions.
This suggest that mutual fund’s preferences for local stocks are unrelated to informational
advantages or manager’s familiarity.
3.2 Data and methodology
We use data from three main sources: CRSP, Morningstar and Zillow. This section provides
a brief summary of those datasets. We also deﬁne and describe the construction of our main
variables.
3.2.1 Data and sample
Stock returns, headquarter addresses, and other relevant market and accounting data come
from the intersection of the CRSP daily and monthly ﬁles as well as COMPUSTAT. We
restrict our analysis to common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) with a valid postal address.
We include penny stocks into our analysis, though eliminating stock with share price lower
than 5 dollars does not quantitatively aﬀect our results.
Data on mutual fund holdings comes from Morningstar. Our focus is on US active
mutual funds investing in US equity. We include funds with at least 1 million dollars of
7E.g. Ferson and Schadt (1996), Christopherson et al. (1998), and Moskowitz (2000) relate fund perfor-
mance to business-cycle variation.
8See also Kacperczyk et al. (2016) for a theoretical model of time-varying managerial skills.
9Vayanos (2004) provides a theoretical model, where fund managers actively adjust the liquidity of their
portfolios in response to the changes in market volatility.
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total net assets (TNA) in order to reduce the incubation bias.10 We require funds to have
available information about the value of their holdings at the end of 2001 for mutual funds
in the boom period and at the end of 2005 for the bust period. We discard mutual funds
with missing postal addresses.
3.2.2 Measuring investors’ biases
To estimate our main relationship of interest, we need to construct variables that capture
mutual fund manager’s preferences towards local stocks. We propose three measures: a
mean distance between a mutual fund and its holdings, a fraction of portfolio held locally,
home bias measure proposed by Coval and Moskowitz (1999) estimated with all US equity
holdings and for the 10 biggest US equity positions.
We use the mean latitude and longitude assigned to each zip-code, in order to match
each mutual fund and the headquarters of each US company with the latitude and longitude
coordinates. We calculate the arc length - the distance di,j between fund i and company j:
di,j = arccos(degi,j) · 2πr
360
,
where
degi,j = cos(lati) · cos(loni) · cos(latj) · cos(lonj)
+ cos(lati) · sin(loni) · cos(latj) · sin(lonj)
+ sin(lati) · sin(latj).
The latitudes and longitudes of a fund i and a company j are given by lat and lon, and r is
the radius of the earth.11 As our ﬁrst measure of home bias, we use the distance to compute
a mean distance between a mutual fund and its holdings:
Distancei,j,t =
J∑
j=1
ωi,j,t · di,j, (3.1)
where ωi,j,t is a fraction of mutual fund i’s portfolio held in stock j in month t.
A second measure of manager’s preferences towards geographically proximate stocks is
10See Evans (2010) for more information on incubation bias.
11We use r ≈ 6, 374 kilometers, see Coval and Moskowitz (1999).
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the fraction of a portfolio held in stocks with headquarters within 100 km radius:
Locali,t =
J∑
j=1
IL · ωi,j,t, (3.2)
where IL is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a company’s headquarters are within
100 km radius away from mutual fund i, and zero otherwise.12
Finally, we use a local bias measure constructed by Coval and Moskowitz (1999), which
is deﬁned as:
Local Biasi,t =
J∑
j=1
(mi,j,t − hi,j,t) · di,j
dMi
, (3.3)
where mi,j,t is a portfolio weight of stock j in the benchmark portfolio, hi,j,t is the fraction
of the fund i’s portfolio invested in stock j, di,j is the distance between fund i and stock j,
and dMi =
∑J
j=1mi,j,tdi,j. We also use the same local bias measure that assesses manager’s
preferences towards local stocks within top ten largest holdings.
3.2.3 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our home bias proxies that capture mutual fund
managers’ preferences towards local stocks, where the cities correspond to mutual fund
location. An average distance between a mutual fund and its holdings varies noticeably by
fund location from 482.88 km for funds located in Syracuse, NY to 2865.52 km for funds
located in Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA during the boom period. In the bust period, mean
distance ranges from 825.57 km (Syracuse, NY) to 2760.14 (Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA).
In 6 cities (Abilene, Des Moines-West Des Moines, Madison, Santa Fe, Tuscon, and Tulsa)
mutual funds do not hold any local stocks in either the boom or the bust period. On the other
hand, for funds located in cities like Lancaster, Reading, San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward,
and Syracuse, local holdings on average constitute more than 5% of a fund portfolio value.
During the boom, mutual funds with headquarters in one of 27 cities seem to overweight their
portfolios towards geographically proximate stocks (Local Bias > 0), whereas in the bust
times, funds located in 33 cities display preferences towards local holdings. Broadly speaking,
this evidence is consistent with ﬁrms increasing local holdings during economic downturns.
Column 4 and 8 presents mutual fund preferences towards geographically proximate stocks
within 10 largest holdings. Mutual funds located in majority of the cities underweight in
their portfolio geographically remote assets.
12Our choice of 100 km for a local threshold is based on Coval and Moskowitz (2001).
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3.3 Methodology and identiﬁcation strategy
Our goal is to model average city-level behaviour of mutual funds and its relationship to
the growth in house prices. Since the main source of variation that we are interested in is
at the city-time level, we use a common two-step estimating procedure. In the ﬁrst-step,
we estimate an equation and the fund level to form regression adjusted, city-averages of
fund behaviour, which form the dependent variable in our second-step. To begin, consider a
fund-level model of portfolio choice, Yi,t,m, where i indexes fund, m denotes the Core Based
Statistical Area (CBSA) in which a given fund is located, and t indexes time:
Yi,m,t = Di,m +Dm,t +Di,t +Dm +Di +Dt + i,m,t.
This speciﬁcation models mutual fund portfolio choice as a function of city-fund ﬁxed-
eﬀects, Di,m, city ﬁxed-eﬀects, Dm, fund ﬁxed-eﬀects, Di, and time ﬁxed-eﬀects, Dt. We
also allow for time-varying behaviour at the city-level, Dm,t, and the fund-level Di,t. i,m,t is
an idiosyncratic error term. This speciﬁcation is, of course, quite general. In order to make
headway, we will have to impose some functional form. We begin by working in diﬀerences.
In particular, we model the changes in fund behaviour over the boom (2002-2005) and bust
(2006-2009) periods, to arrive at:
ΔYi,m,t = ΔDm,t +ΔDi,t +ΔDt +Δi,m,t. (3.4)
ΔYi,m,t captures fund-level changes in behaviour in terms of portfolio choice over the boom
and bust period. An important feature of our identiﬁcation strategy is that this speciﬁcation
eliminates all time invariant fund- and city-level characteristics determining portfolio choice
through diﬀerencing. The term ΔDm,t captures time varying city-level factors that are
common to all funds in city m and ΔDi,t captures time-varying fund behaviour.
We model ΔDi,t as a linear function of fund style. Thus, we allow fund style to impact
portfolio choices in two ways. First, as a ﬁxed-eﬀect that is diﬀerenced away. Second, as
a fund ﬁxed-factor that has time-varying eﬀects. For example, diﬀerent fund styles might
behave diﬀerently over time due to diﬀerent investment strategies. The ΔDt term can
simply be captured with a period dummy. We model ΔDm,t as an unrestricted set of city-
time dummies, imposing no functional form at this point. In particular, the ﬁrst-step in our
empirical procedure estimates:
ΔYi,m,t = α0 + α1 ·Bust+ α′2 · Style+ μm,t +Δi,m,t (3.5)
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In this speciﬁcation, Bust is an indicator for the (2006-2009) period, and Style is a vector
that includes indicators of fund styles.13 μm,t is a vector of coeﬃcients capturing a full set
of unrestricted city-period eﬀects. When estimating (3.5), we use weighted least squares
where the weights are equal to the the size of the fund in the initial period.14 From this
regression, we extract the estimated coeﬃcient vector μˆm,t, which we interpret as regression
adjusted, weighted city-average changes in portfolio choice. For notational simplicity, we
deﬁne ΔY¯m,t ≡ μˆm,t.
Our goal is to model city-level fund behaviour as a function of changes in house price
growth. Thus, the second-step in our empirical procedure estimates an equation of the form:
ΔY¯m,t = β0 + β1 ·Bust+ γ ·Δ lnHouse Pricem,t +Δεm,t (3.6)
The main coeﬃcient of interest in this model is γ, which captures the impact of house price
growth on regression adjusted, city-average fund behaviour. The Δεm,t is a new city-level
error term. Since our empirical approach already controls for unobservable ﬁxed-factors
at the city-level, this term only contains unobserved time-varying city-level factors. OLS
estimation of (3.6) will yield unbiased estimates of γ if shifts in εm,t are unrelated to house
price growth. In practice, this may not occur because of an omitted time-varying city-level
factor that inﬂuences both the price of houses and fund portfolio choice, or because of reverse
causality or simultaneity bias. We discuss how we address these possibilities below.
Our two-step estimation procedure is common but particularly well suited to our empiri-
cal goal. First, since we aim to capture the impact of shifts in house prices on fund behaviour
at the city-level, our main source of variation is at the city-period level. By working directly
at this level of aggregation, we obtain standard errors that already account for clustering.15
Second, in the construction of ΔY¯m,t, we want to take weighted averages to account for the
fact that we are dealing with funds of diﬀerent sizes. This is done by estimating (3.5) with
weighted OLS where we weight by the size of the funds. However, we do not want to impose
these same weights while studying city-level responses to changes in house prices as in (3.6),
since this would allow the behaviour larger cities to overly inﬂuence the parameter estimates
due to the fact that some cities are home to larger funds. At the same time, we want to
13We allow for 9 possible fund styles, capturing small, medium, and large funds of each value, blend and
growth types.
14In particular, we use as weights the market value of US equity held by a mutual fund at the end of 2001
and 2005 for the ﬁrst and second period, respectively. We choose to use ﬁxed weights to account for the
fact that a fund’s market value and portfolio decisions could be jointly determined.
15Accounting for clustering is particularly important in our context, as recent literature points out the
similarity in investment behaviour of mutual fund managers within a city. For example, Hong et al. (2005)
document information ﬂows and knowledge spillovers between managers in the same city. Christoﬀersen
and Sarkissian (2009) provide evidence that more skilled managers tend to work in ﬁnancial centres.
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account for fact that ΔY¯m,t is estimated more precisely in cities with more funds. To do
this, we estimate (3.6) using weighted OLS, where the weights are number of funds in each
city. Finally, our two-step approach allows us to construct ΔY¯m,t while taking into account
that the composition of fund styles may vary across cities.
Identiﬁcation of γ so far relies on the assumption that movements in house prices are
uncorrelated to changes in the city-level error term of equation (3.6). While this assumption
may be plausible, we aim to establish causality by dealing directly with the potential for an
omitted variable or simultaneity regarding fund behaviour and house prices.16 To do this,
we exploit the well-known fact that during the housing boom and bust, house price growth
was strongly correlated with ﬁxed geographical features of cities. In particular, in a series
of papers by Mian and Suﬁ (2011; 2013; 2014), the authors show that house price growth is
strongly inﬂuenced by land constraints that limited the elasticity of housing supply: cities
where the amount of land available for building is scarce experienced particularly strong
growth in house prices while, during the bust, these cities experienced larger falls in housing
prices. We apply their insight by using the percentage of land unavailable for building as an
instrumental variable for house price growth in a two-stage least squares procedure. In our
framework, we allow land unavailability to have diﬀerential eﬀects in the boom and bust
period. Consider the model for house price growth:
Δ lnHouse Pricem,t = δ0 + δ1 ·Bust+ δ2 ·Unavailablem
+δ3 ·Bust×Unavailablem + um,t, (3.7)
where Unavailable is the Saiz (2010) measure of the fraction of land unavailable for
building in city m. Equation (3.7) constitutes the ﬁrst-stage of our two-stage least squares
procedure for estimating equation (3.6). Figure 3.3 shows the variation in topologically
constrained housing supply across cities. The variable Unavailablem takes into account
geographical terrain and water features to determine the degree to which the housing supply
in diﬀerent metropolitan areas is constrained. Cities (e.g. San Francisco or San Diego)
located near the sea and surrounded by a mountain range are characterized by a high
fraction of land that is not available for development, resulting in more constrained housing
supply. On the other hand, cities located in ﬂat areas away from major water bodies (e.g.
Lincoln in Nebraska or Abilene in Texas) are characterized by highly elastic housing supply.
Our main empirical speciﬁcation is a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced, two-stage least squares procedure
relating changes in city-average fund behaviour to house price growth. This identiﬁca-
tion strategy eliminates time-invariant fund- and city-factors aﬀect shift in fund behaviour
16See e.g. Gyourko and Keim (1992), Quan and Titman (1999), and Okunev et al. (2000).
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through diﬀerencing, and potential confounding unobservable city-level factors through an
instrumental variables framework, where our exclusion restriction is the ﬁxed availability of
housing supply due to geographical features of cities. The validity of our exclusion restric-
tion relies on the assumption that changes fund behaviour are not directly inﬂuenced by the
ﬁxed geographical features of cities.
In our baseline analysis, we concentrate on 46 cities located in 33 states across the US.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the distribution of mutual funds across US cities in our
sample. There are 727 (1,023) funds in in the boom (bust) period. One ﬁfth of the funds are
located in New York, 8% of the funds have their headquarters in San Francisco or Philadel-
phia, and 6.5% in Chicago. Salt Lake City is the most topographically constrained (71.99%),
whereas Dayton in Ohio has the fraction of land available for development (98.96%). In Los
Angeles, which has 52.47% land unavailability, the average house price increased by over
250 thousand dollars during boom and fell by almost 175 thousand during bust period. On
the other hand in Lincoln (Nebraska), where developable land is abundant, prices for an
average house barely increased (decreased) by 12 (2.5) thousand in the boom (bust) period.
As we document below, these examples are typical of the relationship between house price
growth and land constraints, forming the basis of instrumental variable strategy.
3.4 Estimation and Results
We design our empirical strategy to estimate the eﬀect of house prices on mutual fund
portfolio allocation decision. In order to identify a causal relationship between local house
price growth and fund manager investment decisions, we proceed with two stage-least-square
(2SLS) analysis. Figure 3.4 supports the choice of geographical land unavailability measure
as an instrument variable for house price growth. Areas with the most topographically con-
strained housing supply experienced the greatest growth in house prices during the boom,
and drop during the bust. Table 3 shows more formally a strong relationship between house
prices and land unavailability, which is necessary for the instrumental variable approach. We
predict house price changes Δ lnHouse Price by means of geographical land unavailability
(Unavailable) measure, bust period dummy variable, and the interaction of those two.
A positive Unavailable coeﬃcient implies that CBSAs with topographically constrained
housing supply experience higher price growth in the expansion period. However, the esti-
mated coeﬃcient on the interaction term is negative. This indicates that from 2006 to 2009
the house prices dropped more in cities where land availability was scarce. The ﬁrst stage
F -test for excluded instruments yield a F -statistics of 9.82 and a p-value of 0.0000, which
suggests that there is a signiﬁcant relationship between land unavailability in booms/bust
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and house price growth.
3.4.1 Tangibles
Investors cash-ﬂows into and out of a mutual fund constitute one of the main reasons
why a fund manager alters his portfolio composition. In the ﬁrst step of our analysis, we
investigate whether mutual fund ﬂows vary with local house prices. Table 4 columns 1 and
2 suggest that local house price growth is not associated with mutual fund net-ﬂows. The
Δ lnHouse Price coeﬃcients in both OLS and IV regression are insigniﬁcant. This result
seems reasonable, since mutual funds invest on behalf of investors domiciled in diﬀerent
cities, states, or even countries. Thus changing local economic conditions in one CBSA
do not aﬀect liquidity needs of an investor living in another CBSA hundreds kilometres
away. Regression estimates in columns 3 – 8 of table 4 further show that fund managers
do not noticeably change their portfolio compositions in response to changing local house
prices. Indeed, they appear to keep the same fraction of the portfolio in form of equity
(columns 3 and 4) or cash (columns 5 and 6). Local house price growth does not aﬀect a
fund manager’s liquidity preferences (columns 7 and 8). In total, these results suggest that
“tangible” attributes of fund behaviour do not very with local house market shocks.
3.4.2 Home bias
Previous studies suggest that localities are strongly related to investors’ trading behaviour.
Engelberg and Parsons (2011) show that geographic variation in the media coverage of
information events is associated with magnitude of local trading. Goetzmann et al. (2014)
relate local weather conditions (cloud coverage) to an institutional investor’s mood, which
in turn partly determines his trading decision.
Consequently, we focus on the eﬀect of local economic conditions on fund manager’s
behavioural biases, in particular home bias. Figure 3.5 relates a fund manager’s industry
allocation decision to a mean distance between a fund and an industry. We group all stocks
into 10 main industries following Kacperczyk et al. (2005). We calculate a mean distance
between a fund and an industry. Next for each mutual fund we assign each industry into
a quintile based on the mean distance to a given fund and estimate a mean fraction of a
portfolio held in each industry quintile. In the left panel, we cannot ﬁnd any observable
relationship between a fund’s proximity to an industry and a fraction of a portfolio held in
that industry. However, the right panel presents a clear pattern in mutual fund preferences
towards geographically proximate industries for funds located in cities with little developable
land (Land Unavailability > Median). By comparing the 2005 bars with 2009, we can infer
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that fund managers increase a fraction of their portfolio held in nearby industries (top three
quintiles) and decrease the fraction of their holdings invested in distant industries in response
to a sharp drop in local house prices.
Next, we investigate this relationship more formally in a regression framework. We use a
two stage-least-square regression approach to estimate the eﬀect of local house price growth
on fund manager’s home bias measures. Regression estimates presented in table 5 suggest
that locally changing house prices aﬀect a fund manager’s decision regarding investment into
local versus distant stocks. According to both OLS and IV regression results, funds with
headquarters in the areas, where house prices decreased the most, seem to invest in those
stocks that are located more closely. In columns 3 and 4, we use local bias measure proposed
by Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and deﬁned in equation 3.3. Whereas the OLS regression
coeﬃcient on change in house prices is negative yet insigniﬁcant, IV regression yields a
signiﬁcant result indicating a strong negative relationship between local house price changes
and mutual fund home bias. This result suggest that fund managers increase (decrease)
their investment in geographically proximate stocks in response to negative (positive) shock
to local house market. This eﬀect is even more pronounced, when we look at ten largest
holdings (columns 5 – 6). In the areas, where house prices decrease (increase) the most,
fund managers even more noticeably select local (distant) stocks for their top ten largest
holdings. In the last two columns, we diﬀerentiate between a local component of a portfolio
and a distant one. A stock is deﬁned as a local holding if the headquarters of a ﬁrm are
within 100km radius away from a mutual fund. In columns 7 – 8, we regress the fraction of
a portfolio held locally (deﬁned in equation 3.2) on house price changes and other control
variables. Especially, the IV regression estimates indicate a strong and negative relationship
between local house price growth and fraction of a portfolio held locally. A decrease in a
local house prices by 1% is associated with 0.73 percentage point increase in a portfolio
share invested in local stocks.
3.4.3 Quality and safety
In face of deteriorating local economic conditions fund managers may prefer stock with
known risks (e.g. local stocks) over unknown. Resent research suggests that uncertainty
about the environment aﬀects fund managers’ asset-allocation decision and may result in
a ﬂight-to-quality.17 When local economic conditions deteriorate, fund managers may be
willing to reduce the undesirable exposure to local risk by shifting their portfolio towards
safer and higher quality ﬁrms. The reason for this shift in mutual fund manager’s preferences
17See e.g. Beber et al. (2009), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), and Chen et al. (2016).
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arises from a manager’s concern that cash-ﬂows of low quality ﬁrms can be fairly sensitive
the systematic risk.
Consequently, we analyse, how local house price growth aﬀects a mutual fund portfolio
composition in terms of quality and safety. For this, we use stock quality and safety measures
constructed by Asness et al. (2013).18 The quality measure captures four dimensions of
quality: proﬁtability, growth, safety, and pay. In addition to the quality of the assets in a
portfolio, we focus on their safety. We expect a fund manager to increase the quality and
safety of his portfolio in response to deterioration in local house prices. Table 6 provides
support for our hypothesis. In areas with the greatest drop in house prices, portfolio’s
quality and safety increase the most. The change in house prices estimated OLS and IV
coeﬃcients are negative and statistically signiﬁcant for both safety and quality regressions
(columns 1 – 2 and 7 – 8). In order to isolate a change in a portfolio’s quality/safety due to
active modiﬁcation of portfolio composition in terms of holdings, we follow Rzez´nik (2016):
AQMi,t = Qualityj,t−1 · pj,t−1
·
(
sharesi,j,t∑J
j=1 sharesi,j,t · pj,t−1
− sharesi,j,t−1∑J
j=1 sharesi,j,t−1 · pj,t−1
)
, (3.8)
where AQMi,t is active quality management of fund i in period t, pj,t−1 is price of stock j
at the end of period t− 1, Qualityj,t−1 is quality rank of stock j at the end of period t− 1,
and sharesi,j,t is a number of shares of stock j held by fund i at the end of period t.
We separately analyse active quality/safety management of assets purchases and sales.
Based on the reported results, fund managers shift their portfolio towards assets of higher
quality and safety in response to deterioration in local economic conditions, by purchasing
high quality and safe stocks. On the other hand, in the IV regression of active quality/safety
management of sales (columns 6 and 12), the estimated coeﬃcient on house price change is
positive, yet insigniﬁcant. This suggests, that fund managers seem to reduce their position
in lower quality and less safe stocks, when they face locally plummeting house prices.
Having established that fund managers exhibit preferences towards local versus distant
assets and actively improve portfolio’s quality and safety in response to deterioration in local
economic conditions, we investigate whether managers employ diﬀerent portfolio strategies
regarding distant and local stocks. Especially, we look at the trading behaviour concerning
quality and safety. In our analysis we divide holdings into local and distant positions.
Local holdings consist of those stocks with headquarters within 100 km radius away from
the mutual fund and constitute part of the fund portfolio. Then, we look at a change
18We thank Lasse Heje Pedersen for sharing this quality measure.
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in a quality/safety of local versus distant component of a portfolio. Table 7 show the
estimation results. Consistent with the previous results, mutual funds located in areas
with deteriorating local economic conditions tilt their portfolios towards high quality and
safer stocks. A fund manager seems to be concern about quality of both local and distant
components of a fund’s portfolio. Therefore, in a face of locally falling house prices, a fund
manager increases quality of local and distant holdings. The Δ lnHouse Price estimation
coeﬃcients in OLS and IV regressions of a quality change in local (columns 1–2) and distant
(columns 3–4) holdings are negative and signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on Δ lnHouse Price in
the local quality regression is more than twice as larger as the coeﬃcient in the regression of
distant holdings’ quality. This may suggest that, while funds shifts toward local stocks, they
ﬁrst and foremost choose local stocks of high quality. The last four columns indicate that
locally changing house prices are associated with the shift towards/away from safer stocks
primarily in the distant component of a portfolio. The coeﬃcient on Δ lnHouse Price in
the regression of local holdings’ safety (columns 5–6) is negative, yet insigniﬁcant.
Our empirical results suggest that mutual fund have preferences towards geographically
proximate, safe and high quality stocks when they are located in areas with deteriorating
local conditions. This ﬁnding leads to an intriguing question: Where do these preferences
originate from? Are they due to a manager’s familiarity bias? Or do they result from
manager’s superior information about geographically proximate assets? We address these
questions by looking at mutual fund performance.
3.4.4 Mutual fund performance
In our analysis, we focus on uncovering the origin of mutual fund preferences towards geo-
graphically proximate assets. We proceed in three steps. First, we test the relation between
mutual fund returns and local house price growth. The underlying reason behind this test, is
to examine whether local house prices are reﬂected in mutual fund performance.19 Second,
we compare the response of returns on local and distant holdings to the local house price
growth. If local informational advantages induce a fund manager to overweight local stock
in the period of locally falling house prices, then we expect the performance of local holdings
to exceed the performance of distant holdings in face of deterioration in local conditions.
Third, we directly look at the impact of shocks to house market on home bias on fund per-
formance. If preferences toward geographically proximate stocks in times of deteriorating
local economic conditions arise for informational advantage, then mutual fund performance
should increase with local bias.
19See Bernile et al. (2015) for the evidence that local conditions aﬀect liquidity of local companies.
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Table 8 summarizes the result for the ﬁrst part of mutual fund performance analysis.
We regress change in 3- and 6-month future return on instrumented house price growth. We
use three measures of mutual fund performance: raw returns, Daniel et al. (1997) (DGTW)
adjusted returns, and market adjusted returns (excess of market return).20 DGTW returns
are constructed by subtracting from each holding’s return the return on a portfolio of ﬁrms
matched on market equity, market-book ratio, and prior one-year return quintiles. The
IV regression estimates in the table suggest that deterioration in local economic conditions
negatively aﬀect mutual fund performance.21 One percentage point decrease in house price
is associated with a 25 bsp and 51 bsp decrease in future 3- and 6-month DGTW adjusted
return, respectively. The analysis of house price growth impact on raw and market adjust
returns provides comparable results, indicating that mutual fund performance signiﬁcantly
deteriorates (improves) in areas where house prices decrease (increase) the most.
In sum, the evidence in table 8 show that there is a direct relationship between mutual
fund performance and local economic conditions. In the next step, we examine whether
this relation can be attributed to a fund’s manager asset allocation decision concerning lo-
cal and distant stocks. In table 9, we relate returns on the local and distant components
of a portfolio to the local house price growth. In columns 1–6, we regress change in fu-
ture returns generated by distant and local components a fund’s portfolio. We report the
regression estimates for DGTW adjusted returns, though the results remain qualitatively
and quantitatively the same if we use raw or market adjusted returns instead. The pre-
sented results suggest that while future returns on local holdings strongly respond to the
local house price growth, returns on distant holdings remain unaﬀected. A one percentage
point decrease in local house prices is associated with 155 bsp drop in a 3-months future
return generated by local holdings. Also the diﬀerence between returns on local and distant
parts of a portfolio signiﬁcantly decreases in response to a deterioration in local economic
conditions. This points out the local part of a portfolio underperforms (outperforms) the
distant component in face of a decline (an increase) in local housing market. The regression
results for 6-month future return are somewhat weaker. However, the pattern remains the
same. At the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance, a one percentage point decrease in local house
price growth is related to 187 bsp drop in a 6-month future return generated by local hold-
ings. The regression results of the diﬀerence in local and distant 6-month future returns,
though insigniﬁcant, suggest that a local portfolio component underperforms (outperforms)
the distant one in face of deterioration (improvement) in local economic conditions.
Finally, we focus on a plausible explanation for an underperformance (outperformance)
20The DGTW benchmarks are available via http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/rwermers/ftpsite/
Dgtw/coverpage.htm.
21The OLS regression coeﬃcients are also positive, yet insigniﬁcant.
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of mutual funds located in the cities experiencing a decline (an increas) in house price
growth. In particular, we focus on the response of mutual fund performance to home bias
induced by changes in local house prices. In order to examine this relationship, we proceed
with 2SLS approach.
When analysing the impact of fund manager’s preferences towards geographically prox-
imate assets on a mutual fund performance, a possible omitted variable problem arises.
Unobservable fund’s manager attention or time-varying strategy may determine both asset
allocation decision and a fund’s performance.22 Thus, we use exogeneous variation in Saiz
(2010) land unavailability as an instrument for mutual fund preferences towards local stocks.
Table 10 shows ﬁrst stage regression estimates for four proxies of a mutual fund’s home
bias: Coval and Moskowitz (1999) measure of local bias for entire portfolio and for the ten
largest holdings, mean distance, and a fraction of a portfolio held locally (withing 100km
radius). In all four ﬁrst stage regression Unavailable and its interaction with a bust period
dummy variable Bust × Unavailable are strongly signiﬁcant with F -test for excluded
instruments yielding p-values smaller than 0.01. In booms, mutual funds located in areas
with scarce developable land become less home bias, increase the distance to their holdings,
and hold less local stocks. The situation is, however, reversed in the bust period. They tend
to exhibit strong preferences towards geographically proximate assets.
The eﬀect of a mutual fund’s local bias measured for the ten largest holdings on a change
in fund’s future performance is presented in table 11, Panel A. Both OLS and IV result sug-
gest that an increase in local bias within top ten holdings is associated with a decrease in
a mutual fund performance. The negative impact of local preferences on fund performance
monotonically increases with the future return horizon. While OLS coeﬃcients are signif-
icant for all reported time periods, IV estimates yield signiﬁcant results in regressions of
4-, 5-, and 6-month future returns. Panel B presents the regression estimates of the change
in mutual fund future returns on the change in the mean distance. The reported results
provide a support to the ﬁndings in Panel A. A decrease in a mean distance (shift towards
more proximate stocks) is associated with a decrease in fund’s future returns. According to
IV regression estimates, a 100 km decrease in a mean distance is associated with a decrease
in future fund performance by 2.9 bsp for 2-month future return and up to 8.1 bsp for
5-month future return. In Panel C, we examine how mutual fund performance is aﬀected
by holding local stocks. We regress the change in a mutual fund future performance on a
change in the fraction of a portfolio held locally and we ﬁnd again a negative and signiﬁcant
relationship. This indicates that investing a greater fraction of a portfolio into local stocks
is harmful for future fund performance. A one percentage point increase in fraction of local
22See Lynch and Musto (2003), Kacperczyk et al. (2014), and Kacperczyk et al. (2016).
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holdings is related to a signiﬁcant decrease in 2-month (5-month) future fund performance
by 27.5 bsp (73.9 bsp). Finally, Panel D relates future fund performance to the measure
of local bias for the entire portfolio. Both OLS and IV regression estimates point out that
preferences towards geographically proximate stocks have a negative impact on fund per-
formance. While all OLS coeﬃcients remain highly signiﬁcant, IV estimates are marginally
signiﬁcant, or insigniﬁcant.
The results presented in table 11 suggest that the eﬀect of local house price growth
on fund manager preferences towards geographically proximate assets is of ﬁrst-order im-
portance, because it is directly related to mutual fund performance. Based on our four
proxies for home bias, we ﬁnd that a shift in preferences towards local stocks is associated
with a mutual fund underperformance. This result eliminate local informational advantage
as an origin of fund manager home bias. Next, the symmetry of our results implies that
fund managers invest in less known stocks, when house prices increase locally, which makes
familiarity hypothesis implausible. Thus, our ﬁndings suggest that investors time-varying
preferences towards geographically proximate assets originate in previously undocumented
behavioural bias.
3.5 Conclusion
We contribute to the empirical asset pricing literature by investigating a potential source of
investor’s home bias. While existing research remains divided on the origin of home bias,
we argue that funds’ time-varying preferences towards local stocks cannot be explained by
informational advantages or manager’s familiarity.
In this paper, we study how local house market shocks aﬀect a mutual fund asset al-
location decision. Speciﬁcally, we examine the eﬀect of local house price growth on fund
manager’s home bias. Our key ﬁnding is that deterioration (improvement) in local economic
conditions is associated with a shift in fund manager’s preferences towards (away from) ge-
ographically proximate assets. A one percentage point drop in local house prices is related
to a decrease in mean distance between a fund and its holdings by 36 km and increase in
a fraction of portfolio held locally by 0.73 percentage point. We ﬁnd also that in face of
locally decreasing house prices, mutual funds put the value of quality and safety before its
cost, and actively increase the quality and safety of their portfolio.
Investigating the impact of local economic conditions on a fund manager home bias,
allows to set informational advantages and familiarity bias apart as a potential source of
home bias. In our analysis, we focus on US equity mutual funds, because they manage
money on behalf of their investors domiciled across the world by investing it into companies
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spread out across US. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that informational advantages of
mutual funds located in a given city are link to a variation in local house price growth.
Using a two stage-least-square estimation approach, we document a series of novel ﬁnd-
ings. We ﬁnd that mutual funds located in areas where house prices decrease (increase) the
most, shift the composition of their portfolios towards (away from) geographically proximate
assets and consequently generate signiﬁcantly lower (higher) future returns. Deterioration
in local economic conditions is also related to underperformance of a local component of
a fund’s portfolio relative to a distant one. Finally, we ﬁnd that a shift in a fund’s man-
ager preferences towards (away from) local stocks induced by a decrease (increase) in local
house prices is associated with signiﬁcantly lower (higher) future fund returns. Symmetry
of our results suggest that fund manager react to positive shocks to local house market by
investing in what they do not know. All together, these results undermine informational
advantage and manager’s familiarity as potential explanations for time-varying home bias
among mutual funds.
This paper contributes to the literature along a number of dimensions. Our primary
contribution is to show that a variation in local economic conditions aﬀect mutual fund
managers’ preferences towards geographically proximate assets. We also document a strong
shift towards safer and higher quality stocks in face of locally decreasing house prices. Last
but not least, we argue that our analysis provides evidence of previously undocumented
behavioural bias. We ﬁnd that deterioration in local economic condition induced shift in
preferences towards local assets is associated with a signiﬁcant decrease in a fund’s perfor-
mance. Overall, our evidence highlights the importance of local economic conditions in fund
managers’ asset allocation decision making.
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Table 3: First Stage Regression. This table shows coeﬃcient estimates and F -test statistics for excluded
instruments from ﬁrst stage regression of house price growth ΔHouse on Saiz (2010) measure of geographi-
cally constraint land Unavailable, its interaction with a bust dummy variable Bust×Unavailable, and
a bust dummy variable Bust, that is equal to one for observations within 2006 and 2009, otherwise zero.
Unavailable
Bust
Bust Constant Observations
Adjusted
F-test
Unavailable R2
Δ House
0.335∗ -0.632∗ -0.272∗ 0.214∗
92 0.781
9.82
(3.06) (-4.41) (-5.23) (5.36) 0.000
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05
Table 4: OLS and IV regressions of funds’ tangibles. This table show regression estimates
from OLS and two stage-least-sqaure regressions of funds’ tangibles on instrumented house price growth
Δ lnHouse Price and a bust dummy variable Bust equal to one for observations within 2006-2009, oth-
erwise zero. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is a change in a percentage net ﬂow between 2002
and 2005, as well as 2006 and 2009. In sepciﬁcation 3 and 4 (5 and 6), the dependent variable is a change
in a fraction of portfolio value held in form of US equity (cash). In sepciﬁcation 7 and 8, the dependent
variable is active liquidity management measure, proposed by Rzez´nik (2016), and computed for two periods
2002-2005 and 2006-2009.
Fund Flows Equity Holdings Cash Holdings Active Liq Mgmt
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ ln House Price
0.539 0.207 -0.0282 0.0388 0.318 -1.168 -0.349 2.334
(1.63) (0.27) (-1.86) (1.00) (0.76) (-1.11) (-0.51) (1.37)
Bust
-0.174 -0.330 -0.0400∗ -0.00860 0.639∗ -0.0590 -2.639∗ -1.383
(-0.97) (-0.88) (-4.83) (-0.46) (2.80) (-0.12) (-7.12) (-1.68)
Constant 0.115 0.221 0.0170∗ -0.00434 -0.202 0.273 1.523∗ 0.667
(0.91) (0.86) (2.93) (-0.34) (-1.26) (0.78) (5.84) (1.18)
Observations 78 78 92 92 84 84 92 92
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.217 0.315 0.166 0.166 0.037 0.652 0.591
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05
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Table 5: OLS and IV regression of funds’ home bias proxies. This table show regression estimates
from OLS and two stage-least-square regression of four home bias proxies on instrumented house price
growth Δ lnHouse Price and a bust dummy variable Bust equal to one for observations within 2006-
2009, otherwise zero. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is a change in a value-weighted mean
distance between a fund and its holdings’ headquarters and calculated for two periods: 2002-2005 and 2006-
2009. In sepciﬁcation 3 and 4 (5 and 6), we use a change Coval and Moskowitz (1999) local bias measure
for entire portfolio (top ten largest holdings). Local Bias meausre is deﬁned as:
∑J
j=1(mi,j,t−hi,j,t) · di,jdMi ,
where mi,j,t is a portfolio weight of stock j in the benchmark portfolio, hi,j is the fraction of fund i’s
portfolio invested in stock j, di,j is the distance between fund i and stock j, and d
M
i =
∑J
j=1mi,j,tdi,j . In
speciﬁcantion 7 and 8, the dependent variable is a change in fraction of the portfolio held locally (within
100km radius away from a mutual fund).
Weighted Distance Local Bias Local Bias Top 10 Local Holdings
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ ln House Price
0.192∗ 0.360∗ -0.0607 -0.257∗ -0.227∗ -0.726∗ -1.757 -7.349∗
(3.47) (2.69) (-1.32) (-2.22) (-2.65) (-3.14) (-1.93) (-2.94)
Bust
0.0721∗ 0.151∗ 0.00368 -0.0884 -0.0618 -0.295∗ -0.157 -2.774∗
(2.40) (2.33) (0.15) (-1.58) (-1.33) (-2.64) (-0.32) (-2.30)
Constant -0.0477∗ -0.101∗ -0.0117 0.0511 0.0432 0.202∗ -0.0540 1.729∗
(-2.25) (-2.28) (-0.66) (1.33) (1.32) (2.64) (-0.16) (2.09)
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.019 0.063 -0.130 0.086 -0.264 0.088 -0.301
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05
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Table 7: OLS and IV regression of funds’ quality and safety for local and distant portfolio’s
components. This table show regression estimates from OLS and two stage-least-square regressions of a
portfolio’s quality and safety on instrumented house price growth Δ lnHouse Price and a bust dummy
variable Bust equal to one for observations within 2006-2009, otherwise zero. A fund’s holding is deﬁned
as local if it is within 100km radius, otherwise it is considered a distant holding. The depentent variable in
columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) is a change in a local (distant) component of portfolio’s quality. The dependent
variable in columns 5 and 6 (7 and 8) is a change in a local (distant) component of portfolio’s safety. The
changes in local and distant components in portfolio’s safety and quality are constructed using Asness et al.
(2013) quality and safety measures at a stock level. All the changes are calculated for two periods: 2002-2005
and 2006-2009.
Local Quality Distant Quality Local Safety Distant Safety
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ ln House Price
-0.264 -0.965∗ -0.181∗ -0.395∗ -0.250 -0.358 -0.102 -0.508∗
(-1.58) (-2.29) (-3.06) (-2.71) (-1.60) (-1.00) (-1.65) (-2.92)
Bust
-0.0868 -0.415∗ 0.0140 -0.0862 -0.0538 -0.105 0.121∗ -0.0692
(-0.96) (-2.04) (0.44) (-1.22) (-0.64) (-0.60) (3.56) (-0.82)
Constant 0.0847 0.308∗ 0.00471 0.0730 0.0494 0.0840 -0.0529∗ 0.0763
(1.32) (2.21) (0.21) (1.51) (0.83) (0.70) (-2.22) (1.32)
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Adjusted R2 0.012 -0.183 0.325 0.226 0.029 0.024 0.515 0.283
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05
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Table 10: First stage regression of home bias measures. This table shows coeﬃcient estimates and
F -test statistics for excluded instruments from ﬁrst stage regressions of a change in a home bias measure
on Saiz (2010) measure of geographically constraint land Unavailable, its interaction with a bust dummy
variable Bust × Unavailable, and a bust dummy variable Bust, that is equal to one for observations
within 2006 and 2009, otherwise zero. The dependent variable in column 1 (4) is a change in Coval and
Moskowitz (1999) local bias measure for top ten largest holdings (entire portfolio). In column 2, we use a
change in a value-weighted mean distance between a fund and its holdings’ headquarters as a home bias
meausre. The dependent variable in column 3 is a change in a fraction of the portfolio held locally (within
100km radius away from a mutual fund). All the changes are calculated for two periods: 2002-2005 and
2006-2009.
Δ Top 10 Δ Δ Local Δ Local
Local Bias Distance Fraction Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unavailable
-0.290∗ 217.2∗ -2.143∗ -0.171∗
(-3.08) (2.12) (-2.17) (-3.44)
Bust×Unavailable 0.468
∗ -424.0∗ 4.584∗ 0.179∗
(3.80) (-3.16) (3.54) (2.75)
Bust
-0.101∗ 93.72 -0.757 -0.0240
(-2.27) (1.93) (-1.62) (-1.02)
Constant 0.0616 -43.70 0.0560 0.0226
(1.80) (-1.17) (0.16) (1.25)
Observations 92 92 92 92
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.094 0.164 0.149
F 7.25 5.09 6.63 5.94
P-value 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.004
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Fraction of a fund’s portfolio held locally and mean house prices in US. This ﬁgure
presents a fraction of a fund’s portfolio held locally and house price patterns. The US average house price
data comes from Zillow Research dataset. The portfolio’s local fraction is value-weighted mean of fraction
of a portfolio held within 100km radius away from a mutual funds using TNA as weights. The data on
holdings of active US funds investing in US equity is provided by Morningstar.
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Figure 3.2: House price growth, home bias and land unavailability. This ﬁgure relates house
price growth and relative change in mean distance to Saiz (2010) measure of land unavailability for each
CBSA included in our sample for both boom (2002-2005) and bust (2006-2009) period. The observations
are weighted by the number of mutual funds in each CBSA. The straight lines ﬁt linear regression models.
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Figure 3.3: Saiz (2010) measure of land unavailability. This ﬁgure presents the variation in topo-
logically constraint land across Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). The measure of land unavailability
has been constructed by Saiz (2010) and it takes into account geographical terrain and water features to
determine the degree to which urban development is constrained by topological characteristics of the land.
Figure 3.4: House price growth and land unavailability measure. This ﬁgure relates house price
growth to Saiz (2010) measure of land unavailability for each CBSA included in our sample for both boom
(2002-2005) and bust (2006-2009) period. The observations are weighted by the number of mutual funds in
each CBSA. The straight lines ﬁt linear regression models.
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Figure 3.5: Mutual funds’ distance to industries. This ﬁgure presents a fraction of a fund’s portfolio
kept in ten industries divided into ﬁve groups based on the distance for the end of the boom (2005) and the
bust (2009) periods. We assign mutual fund holdings into ten main industries based on Fama and French
(1997) industry classiﬁcation. The industry clasiﬁaction is available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_48_ind_port.html. Industries assigned to Close are the
nearest and second-nearest industries to a given mutual fund. Industries grouped in Far are the most and
second most distant industries from a given fund. The left-hand side panel shows mean portfolio percentage
invested in each of 5 industry groups for mutual funds located in areas with land unavailability below the
median. The right-hand side panel shows mean portfolio percentage invested in each of 5 industry groups
for mutual funds located in areas with land unavailability above the median.
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Figure 3.6: Change in mean distance and land unavailability measure. This ﬁgure relates a
change in a fund’s mean distance from its holdings to Saiz (2010) measure of land unavailability for each
CBSA included in our sample for both boom (2002-2005) and bust (2006-2009) period. The observations
are weighted by the number of mutual funds in each CBSA. The straight lines ﬁt linear regression models.
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